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1
Introduction
Periods of high unemployment are generally accompanied by intensive
economic research into the causes of and potential cures for unemploy
ment. This was certainly the case during the decade of the 1980s, which
witnessed a sharp increase in the number of empirical and theoretical
analyses focused on labor market behavior in general and unemploy
ment in particular. The research was motivated by both macroeconomic
and regional unemployment issues.
The marked rise and stubborn persistence of the unemployment rate
in most European countries during the 1980s led to renewed macroeconomic interest in the performance of aggregate labor markets. This
literature has been intensively surveyed by Klau and Mittelstadt (1986),
Helliwell (1988), and Gordon (1990a). The problem of unemployment
persistence led most empirical and theoretical studies to focus on the
question of wage rigidity, since persistent unemployment implies the
failure of the self-correcting properties of wage adjustment. While the
concept of wage rigidity has long played a central role in both classical
(Pigou 1913) and Keynesian (Keynes 1936) theories of unemployment,
recent efforts have been directed at explaining how wage rigidity and
labor market disequilibria can result from the profit- and utilitymaximizing behavior of firms and workers (Davidson 1990).
There are two major policy issues in this macroeconomic research.
The first is the debate over the ability of expansionary monetary and
fiscal policy significantly to lower the unemployment rate (Pierre 1984).
The second policy question concerns the appropriate microeconomic
policy to minimize the degree of wage rigidity and labor market disequi
libria. There is evidence that wage rigidity differs across countries (Coe
1985), that those countries with less rigidity also had less serious
unemployment problems in the 1980s (Grubb, Jackman, and Layard
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1983), and that wage rigidity appears to be related to labor market policy
and industrial relations differences across countries (Layard, Nickell,
and Jackman 1991).
The regional problem motivating recent labor market research was
the emergence of substantial diversity in U.S. regional economic perfor
mance during the 1980s. This diversity is illustrated by references in the
popular press to the shift of economic activity from the "Rust Belt" to the
"Sun Belt"; the effects of defense spending and high technology indus
tries on the "Massachusetts Miracle," and the coexistence of "coastal"
recovery with "heartland" recession. A number of studies have exam
ined the causes of regional shifts in economic activity and the conse
quences of such shifts for unemployment, employment growth, and
income prospects in various regions (see Markusen 1985; Clark,
Gertler and Whiteman 1986; Lampe 1988; and Rodwin and Sazanami
1989). The policy issues connected to this research concern the appro
priate adjustment policies to ameliorate the labor market consequences
of regional change and the development strategies likely to succeed in an
environment of regional change.
Thus far there have been relatively few attempts to apply the insights
from aggregate labor market research to the analysis of regional unem
ployment. That is our focus in this book. We explore the extent to which
wage rigidity differs across regional labor markets in the United States,
the way in which wage rigidity affects the unemployment response to
shifts in regional aggregate demand, and the determinants of differences
in wage rigidity across regional labor markets. Our intent is to provide
greater empirical content for the various theoretical models of wage
rigidity, to enhance our understanding of the interaction of wage responsiveness and regional unemployment over the business cycle, and to
provide some insight for state government policymakers who have been
forced to assume greater responsibility for the design and execution of
labor market policy (Leigh 1989).

Wage Rigidity and Unemployment
We can begin to analyze the relationship between wage rigidity and
unemployment with the simple textbook supply and demand model of
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the aggregate labor market used by Kniesner and Goldsmith (1987). The
aim of their review article is to present some stylized facts about the
cyclical behavior of labor market aggregates and to compare the way in
which various theories perform relative to these facts. There are four
such facts that prove essential to describing how the aggregate U.S.
labor market behaves in a "typical" post-World War II recession.
(1) The fall in real GNP during a recession is accompanied by a drop in
employment of similar magnitude and a rise in the unemployment
rate. The unemployment rate rises by about !/3 of a point for every
percentage point difference between trend growth in real GNP and
actual real GNP growth. This relationship between unemployment
and the real GNP gap is commonly referred to as Okun's law and is
one of the most consistent empirical relationships observed in macroeconomic analysis
(2) The rise in unemployment during a recession is largely due to new
firings and layoffs and represents a decrease in the number of workers
with jobs. Empirically, decreases in employment are far more impor
tant than reductions in hours worked in explaining the decrease in
labor inputs used during a cyclical downturn
(3) The aggregate real wage does not decline in the face of rising
unemployment during a recession The real wage is statistically
independent of the level of economic activity as measured by real
GNP
(4) The aggregate labor supply curve appears to be relatively inelastic
with respect to the real wage level. Thus a decrease in labor demand
coupled with rigid wages leads to disequilibrium in the labor market
rather than, as some have argued, a movement along a flat labor
supply curve to a lower equilibrium level of employment at which any
unemployment would be voluntary.

Figure 1.1 illustrates these stylized facts in a simple supply and
demand model of the aggregate labor market during a recession. The
immediate cause of a rise in unemployment is the decrease in labor
demand associated with falling aggregate output. However, the role of
wage rigidity in explaining unemployment is immediately clear. If the
labor market operated in auction-market fashion and any excess supply
put immediate downward pressure on the real wage, then the effect of

Figure 1.1

Stylized Model of the Aggregate Labor Market in a Typical
Post-World War II U.S. Recession.

Real Wage

W,

W,

D

Employment
Source Kniesner and Goldsmith (1987)

the decline in labor demand on total employment, and therefore in the
unemployment rate, would be much less pronounced. The level of
employment in figure 1.1 would fall only from Nl to N2 instead of to
N3, if the real wage fell so as to clear the market. Real wage rigidity also
plays a prominent role in explaining unemployment persistence. If labor
demand remains depressed for several time periods and the real wage
moves slowly if at all to the market-clearing level, then the time series
data on the unemployment rate will exhibit persistence-a rise in unem-
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ployment in one period will not be offset by a fall in subsequent periods
because the automatic adjustment mechanism in the market fails to work
properly.
The analysis in figure 1.1 follows the usual textbook convention of
treating labor demand and supply as determined by the real wage level in
the absence of money illusion. Hence the importance of rigid real wages
for the explanation of unemployment. However, the real wage is not
determined in the labor market alone. Instead, labor market forces
influence the money wage while the average price level reflects product
market factors. Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish between nomi
nal and real wage rigidity, which may differ in a given labor market. Our
analysis focuses on the responsiveness of wage inflation to unemploy
ment holding constant expectations about consumer price inflation.
Hence, our concern throughout is with measuring and explaining re
gional differences in real wage rigidity.
Kniesner and Goldsmith's (1987) analysis of cyclical unemployment
emphasizes the role of labor demand shifts resulting from decreased real
output. Labor supply is passive in Figure 1.1, merely determining the
number unemployed at any given level of demand and fixed real wage.
In a regional labor market setting, however, it is possible that labor
supply changes through net migration would play a more significant role
in determining the unemployment rate and its persistence. However,
recent studies by Topel (1986), Bartik (1991), and Holzer (1991) all
conclude that shifts in labor demand dominate short-run movements in
wages and employment in regional labor markets with significant mobil
ity costs greatly lengthening the time span of labor supply adjustments
through migration. In terms of figure 1.1, this means that a decrease in
labor demand stemming from an economy wide decrease in total spend
ing —for example, the effects of monetary policy in the 1982 recession—
would, in the short run, be treated in a similar way as a decrease in the
demand for the goods of one region-for example, the effects of the fall
in world oil prices in the 1986-87 recession in the "oil patch" states.
Our reading of the literature comparing aggregate labor market
performance across countries leads us to add three additional stylized
facts to the list provided by Kniesner and Goldsmith. There is some
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empirical evidence that the results of these international comparisons
also apply to contrasts among regions within countries. The additional
stylized facts are:
(1) Unemployment persistence appears to be virtually ubiquitous. In a
careful study of some 19 countries, Robert Barro (1988, p. 34) found
that "the general picture is one of high persistence of unemployment
in the post-World War II period." He measured persistence by the
AR1 coefficients in a time series analysis of unemployment rates.
These coefficients lie close to unity for all countries in his sample bar
Sweden, indicating the general lack of a tendency for unemployment
to revert to a long-run mean.
(2) Wage flexibility varies across countries and regions in a manner that is
correlated with differences in unemployment trends. Evidence on
international differences in the responsiveness of wages to labor
market disequilibrium is provided by Coe (1985 and 1988), Grubb,
Jackman and Layard (1983), Grubb (1986), and Klau and Mittelstadt
(1986) The latter three studies also provide results indicating that
measures of wage rigidity are positively correlated with the change in
unemployment from the 1970s to the 1980s across countries The
conclusion generally drawn from this type of analysis is that wage
rigidity serves to exacerbate the unemployment consequences of
macroeconomic shocks
(3) Wage rigidity and unemployment persistence appear to be related to
government labor market policy and the system of industrial rela
tions. Barro (1988) finds that his measure of unemployment per
sistence is higher in countries with greater union density but lower in
those countries where collective bargaining takes place in a cen
tralized fashion. Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) find a similar
result and add that generous unemployment compensation policies
also contribute to unemployment persistence. On the other hand,
Chan-Lee, Coe and Prywes (1987) find no evidence that wage re
sponsiveness has been affected by changes in government labor
policy. In general, research into the causes of wage induration has
remained largely at the theoretical level to date.

While these three stylized facts are drawn from comparative studies
of national differences in labor market performance, there is some

Table 1.1

Measures of Unemployment Persistence and Wage Flexibility
for 10 U.S. States and 11 West German Lander

Unemployment
Persistence

Wage
Flexibility

California
Florida
Illinois
Massachusetts
Michigan
New Jersey
New York
Ohio
Pennsylvania
Texas

.9971
1 0000
1 0426
9888
1.0038
1.0014
1.0138
1.0062
1 0120
1.0167

.6301
.4392
.7490
.2470
.4667
.0228
2719
.5408
.7997
.9188

Schleswig-Holstem
Hamburg
Niedersachsen
Bremen
Nordrhein-Westfalen
Hessen
Rhemland Pfalz
Baden-Wurtemberg
Bayern
Saarland
West Berlin

1.0537
1.0016
1.0586
1.0654
1.0499
.9988
1 0324
.8970
1.0472
1.0575
1 0496

.4090
5272
.3601
1826
3202
.5036
.4750
.6216
.6148
.3144
.3054

Area

Source Author's estimates Unemployment persistence is the AR1 coefficient in an ARMA(1,1)
time series analysis of the log of the unemployment rate from 1971 to 1985 Wage Flexibility is the
unemployment rate coefficient in a Phillips curve regression explaining wage inflation estimated
over the 1971 to 1985 period, as reported in Hyclak and Johnes (1989)

preliminary evidence to suggest that they also apply to regional differ
ences as well. In table 1.1 we provide some statistics regarding the
applicability of the first two of these stylized facts to regional analysis.
For comparative purposes the table lists data on unemployment per
sistence and wage flexibility for the ten most populous U.S. states and
the 11 Lander in West Germany.
In the first column are indexes of unemployment persistence calcu-
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lated as in Barro (1988) from a time series analysis of the logarithm of
regional unemployment rates over the 1971-1985 period. The indexes
are the AR1 coefficient derived from treating the unemployment time
series as an ARMA(1,1) process. Values of the coefficient close to unity
suggest a high degree of persistence. It is clear from even a cursory
examination of the data that unemployment persistence is a common
characteristic of regional as well as national labor markets.
In the second column, we present measures of wage responsiveness
drawn from our study of regional Phillips curves in Europe and the U.S.
(Hyclak and Johnes 1989). These measures are the absolute coefficients
of the current unemployment rate in regressions explaining wage infla
tion as function of the unemployment rate and expected consumer price
inflation over the 1971-1985 period. As is clear from the table, there is a
considerable degree of variation in this measure of wage responsiveness
across the regions within each country. This is not an unusual finding.
Studies of regional Phillips curve regressions by Kaun and Spiro (1970),
Mathur (1976) and Blackley (1989), among many others, all show
differences across regions in the estimated response of wage inflation to
unemployment.
In our previous papers (Hyclak and Johnes 1989 and Johnes and
Hyclak 1989) we report regression results showing a positive rela
tionship between wage rigidity and unemployment trends across regions
in Europe and the United States. Thus, like the findings regarding
international differences, it seems possible to conclude that wage
rigidity heightens the regional unemployment response to macroeconomic shocks. Finally, Kaun and Spiro (1970) and Hyclak and
Johnes (1992) present evidence indicating that wages may be more
flexible in regions with lower rates of unionization. These results sug
gest that wage rigidity differences are a potentially important determin
ant of regional differences in labor market performance. This book
presents the results of a comprehensive empirical examination of this
issue concentrating on the U.S. states.

Theories of Wage Inflexibility
The studies discussed above have served to establish the existence and
importance of both unemployment persistence and wage rigidity. They
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do not, however, help us fully identify the reasons why such imperfec
tions exist in the labor market. An understanding of these reasons is
essential if governments are to take the appropriate policy steps to
remove these sources of unemployment. Fortunately, the last decade or
so has witnessed the development of several important theoretical ap
proaches to explaining the existence of persistent unemployment and
wage inflexibility. Useful full-length surveys of these have been con
ducted by Carruth and Oswald (1987), Davidson (1990), and Nickell
(1990). Here we consider only the theories which have generated most
interest amongst economists. These can usefully be classified into two
groups. The first of these concerns factors which arise from the interac
tion of firms and their employees. The second concerns policy issues.
Consider first the sources of wage inflexibility which might arise from
the manner in which employers and employees bargain. These ra
tionalizations all rely on the idea that wage rigidity confers a benefit,
since it enables some sort of (assumed) cost within the employment
relationship to be bypassed. This bypassed cost might, for instance, be
the disutility imposed by excessive risk, or it could be the cost of
monitoring worker effort and co-operation, or it could be the costs
associated with hiring, firing and training staff.
The theory of implicit contracts (Baily 1974; Azariadis 1975) is based
on voluntary agreements entered into by firms and workers. These
agreements guarantee risk-averse workers a degree of income stability
in return for wages somewhat below the average (over the cycle) of the
marginal revenue product. Both firms and tenured workers gain from
these contracts; firms gain because their total labor cost falls, while
tenured workers gain because they face a less risky environment. A
slump causes unemployment because the real wage rises as product
prices fall, thereby pricing untenured workers out of jobs. In this model,
then, nominal wage inflexibility reduces the costs associated with work
ers' risk. The success of the contracts model in explaining unemploy
ment relies critically on the failure of indexation (or cost-of-living
adjustments) fully to maintain the real wage at market-clearing level
(Schultze 1985). Sure enough, wages are not fully indexed in the world;
but without a good theoretical reason for this observed fact, contract
theory remains unsatisfactory.
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A theory of more recent vintage, closely related to that of implicit
contracts, has been proposed by Lindbeck and Snower (1988). This is
the theory of insiders and outsiders. Insiders are currently employed or
temporarily laid-off workers, while outsiders are unemployed workers
whose bargaining power with the representative firm is limited. The
externality in this case takes the form of turnover costs (due to hiring and
training). These enable insiders to extract a rent from their employers,
who are willing to pay a premium to prevent quits. Insiders can increase
this rent by issuing credible threats to harass any outsiders who are
hired, thereby further reducing the productivity of new recruits. Thus
the insiders can prevent outsiders from pricing themselves into work by
adopting limit pricing behavior in their wage bargaining.
The insider-outsider categorization of workers into two distinct
groups is reminiscent of earlier theories which explained the low degree
of wage responsiveness to external conditions by appealing to institu
tional arguments. Chief amongst these is Doeringer and Piore's (1971)
theory of internal labor markets. In their model, many posts within a
firm are filled by promotion from within. The remuneration associated
with these posts is not, therefore, determined by competitive forces in
the labor market, since open competition for these jobs is absent. While
the theory of internal labor markets is often advocated as an alternative
to the dominant neoclassical paradigm, it is consistent with a neo
classical world m which the costs of assessing external (or secondary)
labor market candidates for promoted positions is high relative to the
costs of monitoring internal applicants. The challenge now faced by
advocates of both the insider-outsider and internal labor market theories
is to explain how some workers become insiders while others do not.
A further explanation of wage rigidity is provided by the theory of
efficiency wages (Lazear 1981; Summers 1988). The central idea is that
worker motivation and productivity depend positively on the level of
wages. Consequently, firms are reluctant to lower wages during a
downturn, since this might result in a drop in worker effort and firm
profitability. The cost bypassed by the stickiness of wages in this in
stance is the potential detrimental effect on output of reduced worker
effort. The ease of modeling afforded by the efficiency wage idea is
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appealing, but the theory has faced a number of criticisms. Most
seriously, the wage in such models performs two tasks-it regulates the
supply of both hours and effort. The realism of the model may be
enhanced by reinstating the missing price; in other words, we can
introduce into the remuneration system a productivity bonus (or a
promotion structure, or an equity ownership scheme). Once this is
done, the theory is no longer able to explain unemployment. Efficiency
wage theory can, therefore, satisfactorily explain unemployment only
where incentive schemes are, for rational reasons, absent.
Consider now the second broad class of variables which might influ
ence wage flexibility. These are variables which may more easily be
subject to policy influence. The first of these potential determinants of
wage viscosity is unemployment compensation. Burtless (1987) argues
that unemployment benefits increase the duration of unemployment by
financing job search and raising the reservation wage of the unem
ployed. Benefits may also cushion the detrimental effects of short-term
unemployment and may therefore raise the equilibrium wage which
falls out of an efficiency wage model. By providing a floor below which
wages in an otherwise competitive nonunion sector cannot fall, benefits
can further exacerbate unemployment (Minford et al. 1985). Further,
benefits may tilt union preferences away from a concern about their
members' employment prospects and towards the achievement of higher
wage levels.
Minimum wage legislation imposes a floor below which the wage
may not fall. This institutional rigidity is obviously capable of causing
unemployment, although its empirical importance as a source of market
failure in the United States is likely to be slight (Chan-Lee, Coe and
Prywes 1987). The minimum wage rate is rarely changed, so its real
value is constantly being eroded; furthermore, relatively few workers
are covered by the minimum wage.
Finally, the impact of trade union behavior on the flexibility of wages
has been a subject of much debate. The efficient bargains model of
McDonald and Solow (1981) shows that union and firm negotiations
over employment and wage levels can lead to Pareto optima charac
terized by wage inflexibility and unemployment. Although Clark (1990)
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finds that this result does not extend to the more realistic case of bargains
struck over wages and the worker-to-machine ratio, union behavior re
mains an important potential source of nominal rigidity (Minford et al.
1985). We shall therefore pay special attention to the role of unions, and,
in particular, the effects of the right-to-work laws adopted by some states.

Aims and Methodology
It should be clear from the above that we have available at this stage a
number of alternative theories of wage inflexibility, each of which
remains to be fully developed. Unfortunately, while theory has been
racing ahead, empirical work on this issue remains relatively under
developed. Empirical analysis can throw light on which of the alter
native theoretical research programs is most likely to bear fruit, and at
the same time can allow important policy conclusions to be drawn. It is
with this in mind that we embarked upon the present study. Specifically,
we wanted to use empirical methods to answer the following questions:
(1) What local and regional patterns can be observed in labor market
behavior in the United States?
(2) What are the determinants of wage inflexibility?

These questions have not until now been seriously addressed in the
empirical literature, but their answers are critically important. Indeed,
the second question addresses one of the major unsolved macroeconomic puzzles. Both questions are of obvious policy relevance; this
being so, our results can provide information about the impact on wage
flexibility and unemployment of:
•
•
•
•

right-to-work legislation
policies to encourage the development of small firms
minimum wage policy
unemployment benefits.

In addition, we provide evidence about the impact of industry mix and
other structural indicators upon wage flexibility. The mam theoretical
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approaches to involuntary unemployment are confronted with the data
in order to establish which avenues offer the most promise for future
work.
In answering the key questions, we use a unified framework built
upon a simple two-equation model of the labor market. The first equa
tion is a traditional expectations-augmented Phillips curve, where the
rate of wage inflation is determined by unemployment and by the
expected rate of price inflation. The theory underlying this equation has
been explained by Fnedman (1968) as follows. Starting from a point of
equilibrium,
suppose that . . the authority increases the rate of monetary growth.
This will tend initially to lower interest rates and
income and
spending will start to rise. To begin with much or most of the rise in
income will take the form of an increase in output and employ
ment
Producers will tend to react to the initial expansion in
aggregate demand by increasing output, employees by working
longer hours, and the unemployed by taking jobs now offered at
former nominal wages
There is always a temporary trade-off
between inflation and unemployment
The temporary trade-off
comes from unanticipated inflation (pp 9-10).

The Phillips curve is thus a close relative of the aggregate supply
curve (Lucas 1973; Sargent and Wallace 1975), since it concerns a
supply-side response to errors in the formation of price expectations.
The long-run responsiveness of wage changes to the rate of unem
ployment, as measured by the appropriate Phillips curve coefficient,
may be used as a measure of real wage flexibility (Grubb, Jackman and
Layard 1983; Coe 1985; Hyclak and Johnes 1989; Johnes and Hyclak
1989). This aspect of our Phillips curve results therefore merits consid
erable attention in the present context, since it enables us to analyze the
magnitude and nature of wage viscosity for each of the geographical
samples in the study.
This tells only half a story, though. Certainly unemployment exerts
an influence upon wage inflation. But the rate of change of wage rates
also has an impact on unemployment. This is because the derived
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demand for labor varies negatively with the real wage. Consequently,
any increase in wages that is not matched by an increase in prices or
product market demand must lead to a decline in the demand for labor,
and unemployment results. This idea was put forward by Irving Fisher
(1926) and can be derived from Okun's law (Okun 1962). To be more
precise, we model the unemployment rate as a function of lagged
unemployment, nominal growth of aggregate demand, and wage infla
tion. This specification of the "Fisher curve" allows us to investigate
certain issues concerning unemployment persistence, since the coeffi
cient on the lagged dependent variable captures an effect similar (though
not identical) to Barro's persistence measure.
In order fully to account for the simultaneous nature of the rela
tionship between wage inflation and unemployment, we use a systems
method to estimate the parameters of both the Phillips curve and the
Fisher curve. This approach is one of the major innovations we intro
duce in chapter 2. The second innovation introduced in that chapter
concerns the level of analysis at which our analyses are conducted.
Following the lead of Blackley (1989), we study data at state level within
the United States; our study, however, improves upon earlier work in that
we cover all 48 contiguous states. Moreover, our disaggregation goes
further than state level, for we also present estimates of the model for 16
of the largest standard metropolitan areas.
Our reasons for disaggregating the analysis to state and metropolitan
areas are several. First and foremost, we disaggregate because labor
market decisions are typically reached at the local level. In a full
employment world, migration might be expected to equalize remunera
tion for given work across localities, thus removing in the long run any
distinction between areas. However, the same is not true if unemploy
ment exists, or if migration responds imperfectly to labor market
inequalities. Areas where unemployment is high can maintain a stable
labor force only if remuneration is also high relative to that obtainable
elsewhere. Once housing effects are introduced, the picture becomes
still more complex; areas in which housing is expensive must also be
high-wage areas if they are to prevent net out-migration of labor, other
things (such as unemployment rates) being equal. Thus distinct local
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labor markets can be defined (Topel 1986), in much the same way as
distinct local policy jurisdictions within a Tiebout (1956) model; indi
vidual preferences determine whether a worker will choose to reside in
an area with high rate of joblessness (where wages compensate for the
risk of unemployment) or a locality where unemployment is relatively
uncommon. Consequently, despite the existence of national (and indeed
international) markets for the labor of a minority of very highly skilled
workers, the state or metropolitan area makes a more appropriate level
for labor market analysis than does the nation.
The second important reason for spatial disaggregation is that it
enables us to proceed to an analysis of the reasons why wage rigidity
varies across states. This is the main contribution of chapter 3. The
analysis builds upon the contribution of Grubb, Jackman and Layard
(1983), but by studying regions within a single country (rather than a
cross section of OECD nations) we are able to provide a reasonably
homogeneous social, cultural, political, and institutional setting.
A third reason for conducting our analyses at the state and local level
is that it allows us to study regional variations in labor market behavior
across the country. A number of hypotheses can thus be tested. For
example: do labor markets in some states (such as those in the Rust-Belt
which have endured rapid structural decline) respond differently to
economic shocks than do other states? If so, would different labor
market policies be appropriate in different regions? Is wage inflation
transmitted across the country according to an established set of geo
graphical patterns (Martin 1981)?
To summarize briefly: we estimate separately for 48 states and 16
metropolitan areas the parameters of our labor market model. This
enables us to draw important and novel inferences about the dynamics of
unemployment, and regional differences in the operation of the labor
market can be identified. Since the flexibility of wages varies substan
tially across the states, we are also able to analyze the determinants of
real wage induration. These contributions all have important policy
implications: they tell us what counter-unemployment policies might be
effective in the various regions of the country, and they suggest measures
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that could be taken to make wages more responsive to the swings of the
market.
Structure of This Book
In chapter 2 we develop the theory and conduct the empirical time
series analyses. The theoretical and empirical models build on previous
work and involve the simultaneous estimation of Phillips and Fisher
curve equations. Variants of our model are tested and a preferred set of
results is identified. Thus we can comment upon regional patterns
emerging from the results and identify areas within which demand- or
supply-side policies would be appropriate as means of alleviating the
problem of unemployment. Both states and metropolitan areas are used
as bases for our analysis in this chapter; metropolitan areas are particu
larly interesting because they most nearly approximate the size of local
labor market within which we believe most employment decisions are
made. The novelty of chapter 2 is primarily seen in the extent of
disaggregation used: for the first time, Phillips and Fisher curve esti
mates are presented for all 48 contiguous states and for 16 cities.
The slopes of the Phillips curves estimated in chapter 2 are a vital
input into the work reported in the following chapter. The work reported
in chapter 3, using these coefficients, represents what we believe to be
the most important original contribution of this book. There we provide
an empirical investigation of the differences in measured wage flexibility
between the 48 contiguous states. As we have already seen, the received
literature is strong on theory concerning wage inflexibilities, but only a
handful of rather speculative papers have treated this important issue
from an empirical standpoint. By conducting a cross-section analysis of
48 states, we gain significant new insights. We investigate the role of
efficiency wages, insider-outsider effects, union behavior, welfare bene
fits, industrial concentration, and other factors on the flexibility of
wages. The results are interesting and policy-relevant.
The final chapter of the book draws together the main results and
conclusions. It also contains an extended discussion of the policy im
plication of our findings.

Regional Wage Inflation and
Unemployment
This chapter examines the cyclical interaction of wage inflation and
unemployment in order to determine the extent to which wage flexibility
varies across regional labor markets in the United States. We follow Coe
(1985) and Grubb, Jackman and Layard (1983) in measuring wage
flexibility as the coefficient on the unemployment rate in a Phillips-type
wage adjustment equation. Thus we define regional labor markets with
highly flexible wages as those with a relatively large estimated responsiveness of money wage inflation to the unemployment rate.
The Phillips (1958) model of the wage adjustment process is built on
the hypothesis that a greater degree of labor market slack, as measured
by the unemployment rate, causes a slower rate of wage inflation, other
things equal. However, it is clearly possible for causation to run from
wage inflation to unemployment. Ceteris paribus, a rise in the rate of
money wage inflation could be expected to result in a rise in the
unemployment rate if wages were rising faster than the marginal reve
nue product. In order to adjust for the simultaneous relationship be
tween wage inflation and unemployment that could bias the coefficient
estimates we use to measure wage flexibility, we specify and estimate a
two-equation labor market model that treats wage inflation and unem
ployment as jointly endogenous variables.
Our primary test for regional differences in wage flexibility focuses
on estimates of our regional labor market model on annual data covering
the period from 1964 to 1986 for each of the 48 contiguous states. Some
might argue that the state is too large an area to be observationally
equivalent to a regional labor market. However, data limitations and
changes in area definitions limit the number of metropolitan areas for
which adequate time series can be constructed. We do present estimates
17
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for 16 large metropolitan areas as a check on the results from state data.
Anticipating the conclusions from this part of the study, we find that the
model fits the time series pattern of unemployment and wage inflation
rates for almost all of the states and metropolitan areas studied and that
there is evidence of substantial regional variation in the responsiveness
of wage inflation to unemployment.

Regional Labor Market Model
Our time series model of the rates of wage inflation and unemploy
ment is very similar to the "simple two-equation structural model of the
economy" used by Hall (1975, p. 303) and the three-equation model
employed by Layard and Bean (1989). In both of these papers, wage
inflation is determined by the unemployment rate and expected price
inflation; with cost-plus pricing, unemployment is determined by the
interaction of money supply growth and wage inflation. While Hall as
well as Layard and Bean use their models to study the characteristics of
long-run, equilibrium unemployment rates, our interest is in developing
this approach as a means of estimating short-run cyclical movements in
wage inflation and unemployment.
Expanding Hall's unemployment equation to take into account unem
ployment persistence and a broader measure of aggregate demand
growth, we specify the following model:
e,

(2.1)

lMf + ez

(2 -2)

Where w is money wage inflation, U is the unemployment rate, p is the
rate of change of consumer prices, y is the percentage change of nominal
gross product in the regional economy, and e , and e2 are random error
terms.
Equation (2.1) presents the wage adjustment process in terms of a
conventional Phillips curve relationship. Excess supply in the labor
market dampens wage inflation by lowering the reservation wage of
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unemployed outsiders and by reducing the bargaining strength of insid
ers. Expected price inflation, measured in equation (2.1) as a function of
lagged price inflation, also feeds through into the determination of the
rate of change of money wages, since workers base their labor supply
decisions on (their perceptions of) the real wage. Our choice of a
parsimonious Phillips curve specification is influenced by the careful
investigation of alternative Phillips curve specifications by Coe (1985)
and by the results of our previous studies (Hyclak and Johnes 1989 and
1992; Johnes and Hyclak 1989). The estimates of the coefficient a,
serve as our index of regional wage flexibility.
The unemployment rate model in equation (2.2) is not standard in the
literature, although Clark (1981) estimates a quite similar equation for
Canadian provinces. Thus this relationship requires a more detailed
discussion than does the Phillips curve. We refer to this relationship as a
Fisher curve after Irving Fisher's (1926) analysis of regressions showing
a strong positive relationship between a distributed lag on product prices
and the level of employment. Fisher's explanation for this empirical
result focused on the effects of demand increases relative to wage levels.
He argued that wages and other input costs were relatively fixed in the
short run and that an increase in demand which raised selling prices in
the short run would result in an increase in labor demand. We call
equation (2.2) a Fisher curve because it embodies a similar explanation
for unemployment. Unemployment in that equation depends on the
growth of demand, measured by the rate of change of nominal Gross
State Product (>>,), relative to the rate of change in money wages
The mam determinant of unemployment in this model is the rate of
change of aggregate demand for goods produced in the regional labor
market. This demand emphasis is consistent with the stylized facts about
the cyclical behavior of U.S. labor markets and the evidence on the role
of demand shocks in determining changes in local employment dis
cussed in the preceding chapter. We assume thatyt is exogenous because
this variable can be treated as being determined largely by national
monetary policy and by export demand (Beare 1976). The split of
demand growth into real output changes and price changes is endoge
nous and in large part depends on the responsiveness of wage inflation to
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changes in unemployment. In the appendix to this study we check the
sensitivity of our estimates to this assumption that local demand growth
is exogenous.
The current unemployment rate is also expected to be positively
related to lagged unemployment. As discussed in chapter 1, Barro
(1988), among others, presents evidence of a substantial degree of
unemployment persistence for all western economies. One possible
explanation for this empirical regularity is that high unemployment in
the past leads to a large number of long-term unemployed in the current
period. The long-term unemployed may be increasingly ineffective in
finding employment due to low morale, skill deterioration, and/or
employer screening (Blanchard and Summers 1987).
Equation (2.2) can be derived from two simple but often-used rela
tionships in macroeconomics. The first is normal cost mark-up pricing,
as expressed in equation (2.3) below.
The rate of product price inflation equals the rate of wage inflation
adjusted for the potential rate of productivity growth,
dt = wt -(q*-N*).

(2.3)

Here dt is producer price inflation, q* is the rate of real potential output
growth, and Nt* is the rate of potential employment growth.
The second relationship is a dynamic version of Okun's law relating
changes in the unemployment rate to the net effect of nominal demand
growth, potential output growth and price inflation. This can be written
as :
Ut = Ut _ l +Q(yt -q*-dt).

(2.4)

Substituting equation (2.3) into equation (2.4) yields a relationship like
our Fisher curve with clear hypotheses about the coefficients in the
relationship. The coefficient on Ut _ { is hypothesized to equal 1.0, and
those on yt and wt are hypothesized to be equal in magnitude but with
opposite signs. Interestingly, estimates for the United States as a whole
for the postwar period cannot reject these hypotheses about the coeffi
cients of the Fisher curve (Hyclak and Johnes 1990).
Of course, these parameter hypotheses depend on the underlying
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simple model. If, for example, the mark-up rate depends on current
economic activity, and lagged unemployment and wage inflation influ
ence current unemployment by labor supply as well as demand effects,
the parameter hypotheses of the resulting Fisher curve could be quite
different. Nevertheless, this exercise gives us some insight into the
derivation of our Fisher curve and leads us to expect values of /3, in
equation (2.2) that lie close to 1.0 and estimates of /32 and j33 that are
similar in magnitude but of opposite signs.
Although our two-equation labor market model is far too simple to be
considered a complete econometric model of regional labor markets, it
does offer a number of advantages for the purpose of estimating regional
differences in wage flexibility. First, it gives us a way of treating nominal
wage inflation and the unemployment rate as jointly endogenous vari
ables, thereby addressing the potentially serious problem of simul
taneity bias in our estimates of the wage flexibility coefficients. Second,
the model incorporates the concepts of wage rigidity and persistence in
explaining the effects of demand shocks on unemployment. A sustained
drop in demand growth causes a sustained rise in unemployment unless
wage inflation falls far enough and fast enough to offset the effect of the
demand slowdown. We use this feature of the model to conduct simula
tions of the effects of changes in demand growth on unemployment
under various wage flexibility conditions. Finally, the model can be
estimated with available time series data for the states and some metro
politan areas. This is a considerable advantage, since data availability is
perhaps the most significant constraint on regional economic research.
The basic weakness of this model is that it does not directly consider
supply-side effects, such as migration and changes in labor force par
ticipation, on the local unemployment rate. These forces are captured, if
at all, by the intercept of the Fisher curve. However, given the conclu
sions of Topel (1986), Holzer (1991) and Bartik (1991), discussed in
chapter 1, our emphasis on demand-related determinants of unemploy
ment might not be misplaced. And, after all, our primary purpose in
estimating the model is to determine the extent to which wage flexibility
varies across regional labor markets rather than to model all possible
determinants of unemployment.
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Empirical Analysis

In previous studies we have used the model described above to study
regional wage and unemployment dynamics in Great Britain (Hyclak
and Johnes 1992), and to produce an international comparison over a
long period of cyclical movements in the labor market (Hyclak and
Johnes 1990). The analyses in this section use data for the years 1964
through 1986, collected for the 48 contiguous states and 16 large
metropolitan areas of the United States.
The main software package used to perform the statistical analyses is
RATS, version 3.01. Data have been analysed using the three-stage least
squares (3SLS) method. A separate two-equation system, based upon
the theoretical model of equations (2.1) and (2.2), has thus been esti
mated for each state. The Appendix presents a comparison of the 3SLS
results reported here with those obtained by ordinary least squares
(OLS) and two-stage least squares (2SLS). That comparison suggests
that for most states the method of estimation makes no significant
difference in the parameter estimates. This is especially the case for the
wage flexibility coefficients, for which the OLS, 2SLS, and 3SLS
estimates are all highly correlated across the states. For some states,
however, Hausman tests indicate that 3SLS is the appropriate estimator;
we present just those results here to make cross-state comparisons easier
and more consistent.
Wage inflation is measured as the rate of change in average hourly
earnings in manufacturing using data obtained from various issues of the
Handbook of Labor Statistics. Two types of compositional effects in the
cyclical movement of this variable need to be recognized, even though
there is little we can do to correct for them. During a recession, less
senior, lower-wage employees are likely to be laid off first, in which case
the use of average earnings might overstate the true rate of change in
wages. Working to understate the true rate of change when average
earnings are used to measure wage inflation is the fact that layoffs are
more prominent in the higher paying durable goods manufacturing
industries. In any case, average hourly earnings in manufacturing is the
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only wage measure for which we can obtain a sufficiently long time
series for all states.
The unemployment rate data for each state are taken from two
sources. Data for the earlier years in our sample are estimates based on
unemployment insurance and other workforce records, the so-called
"handbook method," and taken from various issues of the Manpower
Report of the President. Data for later years are unemployment esti
mates derived from the Current Population Survey and supplied by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics. For the 10 largest states, the survey data
were first available in 1967. Current Population Survey unemployment
rates are available for 16 additional states beginning in 1970, for 2 states
starting in 1972, and for the remaining states in 1976. Inspection of the
data for overlapping years indicated that the handbook estimates gener
ally fell within the error range at a 90 percent confidence level of the
survey estimates.
Consumer price inflation is measured as the rate of change in the
personal consumption expenditures deflator using data from the Eco
nomic Report of the President. No local price data exist for states, hence
the use of a national measure of consumer price inflation. The results
reported below for metropolitan areas do use local consumer price index
data in some of the estimates. Finally, the rate of change in aggregate
spending on goods and services produced in the region is measured by
the percent change in nominal Gross State Product (GSP). Annual GSP
estimates for 1963-1986 were kindly provided by the U.S. Department
of Commerce.
The choice of instrumental variables can obviously be a matter of
considerable importance when estimating the parameters of a system of
equations. The specification of the equations being estimated should, of
course, be chosen so as to ensure that the coefficients are reasonably
robust with respect to the choice of instruments; our early experiments
confirmed that this is the case with our chosen model. That condition
being satisfied, our choice of instruments has been governed by the
requirement that the model should provide good forecasts of the endoge
nous variables (both within and outside the sample period), while
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ensuring also that the specification remains parsimonious. To this end,
our experimentation with various sets of instruments has been extensive.
Our preferred set of instruments consists of the exogenous variables
which appear in the two-equation system, plus the lagged national
percentage growth rates of real Gross National Product (GNP) and
hourly earnings in manufacturing.
The estimated Phillips curves for each state are reported in table 2.1.
A glance at the coefficients indicates that there are few surprises. In all
the states bar two (Connecticut and New Mexico), unemployment
affects wage inflation in the expected negative direction. In the two
atypical cases, the coefficient on unemployment does not differ signifi
cantly from zero. Unemployment exerts a significantly negative impact
on wages (at the 5 percent level) in 32 of the 48 states.
The results for Connecticut and New Mexico suggest the presence of
complete hysteresis in wage adjustment in those labor markets. Hys
teresis has received considerable attention in recent attempts to explain
unemployment persistence (see, for example, Blanchard and Summers
1987; Johnson and Layard 1986; and Lindbeck and Snower 1988). One
implication of the hysteresis process is that wages may be responsive
only to changes in unemployment and completely unresponsive to the
level of unemployment, regardless of how high unemployment rates
become.
In order to test this implication of hysteresis for the wage adjustment
process, we employed a Phillips curve specification developed by Franz
(1987). By including the current and lagged unemployment rates in the
equation, it is possible to interpret the sum of the coefficients on these
two variables as the effect of the level of unemployment on wage
inflation and the negative of the coefficient on lagged unemployment as
the effect of changes in unemployment on wage inflation. Results of
these estimates, not reported here but available from the authors, indi
cate that the level effect for both Connecticut and New Mexico is not
significantly different from zero, but that changes in unemployment
have a statistically significant impact on wage inflation at the 5 percent
level for Connecticut and the 10 percent level for New Mexico.
Partial hysteresis effects, where both the level of and change in
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Phillips Curve Estimates, 48 States, 1964-1986
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Figure 2.1

Geographical Pattern of Wage Flexibility Coefficients
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ai<-l 0

-0 50>ai> -I 0

unemployment are significant determinants of wage inflation, were
found for the older industrial states of Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan,
Indiana, and Missouri, as well as for Georgia, Idaho, and Oregon. Since
the change in unemployment was not a statistically significant determin
ant of wage inflation for most states and since the level effect of
unemployment m these regressions is highly correlated with the esti
mates of a l reported in table 2.1, we concentrate our attention on the
results obtained from the simple Phillips curve specification developed
in the section above.
As can be seen from the map shown in figure 2.1, the unemployment
coefficients reported in table 2.1 exhibit a pronounced spatial pattern.
They tend to be close to zero in the Northeast and, interestingly, in the
South Central states, but often exceed unity (m absolute terms) in the
Pacific and West North Central states. These findings are very much in
accord with those of Blackley (1989). Chi-square tests reject the null
hypothesis that a, = — .78, the mean value of a, across the 48 states, for
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15 states at the five percent level and for an additional 4 states at the ten
percent level. These results suggest there was considerable variation in
wage flexibility across the 48 states during the 1964-1986 sample
period.
Theory predicts that the coefficient on the expected price inflation
term in the Phillips curve should lie close to unity. Despite our choice of
an extremely simple form of expectations formation, this prediction is
fulfilled m all but a very few states. In all states, this coefficient
significantly exceeds zero at the 5 percent level. Only for New
Hampshire, Massachussetts, Connecticut, Georgia, and Mississippi is
this coefficient significantly below one at the same level; for Oregon and
Washington the coefficient significantly exceeds one.
The coefficients of determination are reported in table 2.1 alongside
the regression equations. The R2 statistics here are those of an OLS
regression of actual wage inflation on that forecast in a static fashion by
the model. The fit of the estimated Phillips curve to the data is sound in
almost every case. Four of the equations do, in this respect, give some
cause for concern, however. Delaware produces an equation with rather
low explanatory power, as do three of the Mountain region states,
namely, Montana, Idaho, and Wyoming. The predominance of agri
culture and mining in the Mountain region may account in part for the
poor performance of the Phillips curve regressions in these states, since
the use of manufacturing wages to capture general wage inflation may be
inappropriate here. As we shall see later, however, the equation esti
mated for Montana is unsatisfactory also in certain other respects, and is
likely to need further investigation. Delaware is somewhat different;
this is an example of a small state whose labor market may be dominated
by employment opportunities in neighboring states, so that unemploy
ment conditions within Delaware alone cannot adequately explain real
wage movements within the state. These problems will be pursued
further in the Appendix.
It is important before proceeding further to test for any violations of
the assumptions underlying the 3SLS method used above. The first
violation for which we test is that of serial correlation of the regression
residuals. The Durbin-Watson statistic, d, is reported for each of the
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estimated Phillips curves in table 2.1. In one state—Washington— d falls
below the lower critical value at both the 5 percent and 1 percent levels of
significance. The remaining states all have Durbin-Watson statistics
acceptably close to the ideal value.
We next conduct a test for misspecification of the Phillips curve
equation. The RESET statistic devised by Ramsey (1969) is appropriate
here, and should be especially useful as a means of ascertaining whether
or not nonlinear terms need to be introduced into the Phillips function.
The 5 percent critical value of the second order RESET statistic, as
reported in table 2.1, is F(2,20) = 3.49. The corresponding 1 percent
critical value is 5.85. Of the 48 state-specific Phillips curves, only for
Florida and Montana is there significant evidence of misspecification at
the 5 percent level. At the 1 percent level, all equations pass the RESET.
Finally, we test for the possibility that the regression residuals are
distributed in non-Gaussian fashion. The normality test devised by
Jarque and Bera (1980) to check for skewness and kurtosis in the error
vector is used here. The Jarque-Bera test statistic follows a chi-square
distribution; in the case of the regressions reported in table 2.1, the
critical value is 5.99 at the 5 percent significance level. Only two
states—Missouri and Montana—fail this test. At the 1 percent signifi
cance level, the critical chi-square value is 10.60. Only in Missouri is
the non-normality test failed at this level. The presence of non-normally
distributed residuals often results from an outlying value of the depen
dent variable during a single time period. We again investigate this later
in the Appendix.
Despite the problems referred to above, the overall performance of
this specification of the Phillips curve is good. The estimated equation
fits the data closely for all but a few states, yielding sensible coefficients
and churning out remarkably few statistical problems.
The 3SLS estimates of the Fisher curve are reported in table 2.2. In
general the parameter estimates appear quite plausible for most states,
given the hypotheses derived from our simple theory combining Okun's
law and cost-plus pricing to yield the Fisher curve. Recall that the
theory hypothesizes that 18,, the coefficient on lagged unemployment,
equals one and that 02 and /33 , the coefficients on aggregate demand

Table 2.2 Fisher Curve Estimates, 48 States, 1964-1986

00

New England:
1.29
ME
(.91)
.23
NH
(89)
VT
1.29
(.90)
1 53
MA
(1.06)
.87
RI
(132)
2.19
CT
(.75)
Middle Atlantic:
.67
NY
(.90)
1 84
NJ
(-71)
77
PA
(75)

Pi

02

8284
(.1794)
.9371
(1137)
.8520
(.1184)
8233
(.1116)
7489
(.1716)
8116
(.1248)

-.3079
(.1132)
-.3692
(.06222)
-.2643
(.06227)
- .4048
(.09115)
- .3708
( 1168)
-.3479
( 0725)

.3794
( 1033)
5894
(.1084)
.3051
(.0958)
4688
( 1516)
5940
(.1892)
3121
(.1282)

7746
(.0956)
.8729
(.0935)
9916
(.0730)

-.2276
( 0913)
-.4284
(.0912)
- 4735
( 0873)

.4208
(.1045)
.4284
(.0794)
.4602
(0818)

03

RESET

JarqueBera

1 858

.1869

1 1607

.6681

8933

2.527

1 2310

1.4919

-1.5080

.8055

2230

.0700

2.2409

-.6700

.8621

2.324

.1043

1.6085

-.9198

7877

2607

1.1310

1.4380

-2.5620

.8479

1.879

1792

.8400

.3622

.8925

1 195

2399

1.5290

2.1720

.9120

1.535

.3044

9756

1 2480

.9484

2.039

2.9624

1.4515

-.0999

R2

d

.7687

h

Table 2.2 (continued)
0o
East North Central:
1.09
OH
(.55)
.87
IN
(.61)
.89
IL
(.64)
79
MI
(.65)
.86
WI
(.67)
West North Central:
.29
MN
(.88)
-.57
IA
(.59)
.34
MO
(65)
-.06
ND
(1.31)
-.65
SD
(69)

0i

02

03

.9232
(.0577)
.9064
(.0606)
9723
( 0537)
.9145
(.0574)
.9577
(.0701)

-.3925
(0475)
-.3083
(0446)
- 3617
(.0544)
-.3491
(.0400)
-.3680
(.0566)

.3904
(.06628)
.3393
(.0682)
.3484
(.0622)
3943
( 0816)
.4000
(.0685)

.8677
(.1146)
1.0386
(.0763)
9548
(.0806)
1.0050
( 2374)
1.0830
(.1372)

-.1289
(.0456)
-.1019
(.0243)
-.2657
( 0573)
- .0305
(.0110)
- 0302
(.0131)

.2449
(.0680)
.2206
(.0515)
.3468
(.0790)
.0686
(.0572)
.1115
(.0332)

JarqueBera

h

R2

d

RESET

9683

2.589

1.1602

.34326

- 1 4700

.9377

3.003

.3304

.1123

-2514

9565

2478

.6584

1 0623

-1.187

.9220

2748

.02170

25853

-1 866

.9278

2.143

1778

1.4826

- 364

.8016

2722

.4212

-2.072

.9516

2614

6225

1.3360

-1.582

8874

2.540

.6661

9339

-1.404

.6286

20

.1046

1 5984

—

7896

2350

.2934

1.4812

-1.115

1 065

14
(.89)
1.40
KS
(.63)
South Atlantic:
- 90
DE
(.88)
1 09
MD
(65)
.94
VA
(.67)
WV
.68
(1.50)
1.50
NC
(98)
1.69
sc
(-79)
1.30
GA
(69)
220
FL
(.94)
East South Central:
.49
KY
(.99)
.66
TN
(.81)
NB

9223
(.1597)
.8035
(.1245)

-.1125
(.0319)
-.2070
(.0442)

.1828
(.0593)
.2059
(.0545)

.5850
( 1231)
8550
(.0751)
.7854
( 0908)
9161
(.1035)
9889
(.1251)
8263
(.0766)
.9435
(.0934)
.7345
( 0922)

-.0647
(.0413)
-.2216
(.0620)
-.1897
(.0656)
-.4387
(.1282)
-.4804
(.0885)
-.3304
(.0505)
-.2813
(.0540)
- 2840
(.0639)

6329
(.1365)
.2708
(0497)
.2995
(.0618)
.5433
(.1436)
.4654
(.1197)
.3869
(.0765)
.2945
(.0883)
.4333
(.0956)

.9441
(.0894)
.9058
(.0705)

- 3571
(.0751)
-.3130
(.0561)

.4611
(.1235)
.4514
(.0896)

.8009

2.193

.4923

24277

-.719

.7332

2.289

.3369

.6972

-.863

.9140

2.350

3.6000

8470

-1.040

.9572

1.934

.3068

.2201

169

.8949

1.743

3633

.5641

684

.8975

1.495

.9016

.5407

1.395

8232

2499

1.0701

5636

-1.496

8782

1.450

1.4650

9246

1.418

.8887

1.667

.5690

.4254

.893

.8684

2.288

.1809

2.4544

-.770

.9261

2 131

2.6290

1.2101

-.347

.9304

2.080

2.8790

1.7881

- 203
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JarqueBera

1.561

.8680

.3056

1.158

9237

2 184

1 2170

1.9473

-.5031

8523

2.036

.0513

3450

-.0973

.9232

2.102

1.4520

1.0376

-.2705

.9121

1.829

1 5380

.7757

.4521

.8762

2436

.0492

1.3660

-1.1420

.8252

1.293

1 1480

.9746

2 1550

8452

2.664

5.2080

.8181

-2.4900

7915

2.568

6.3350

0428

-

.7557

2.607

1.6530

.9152

-2.8560

R2

d

00

0i

.14
(102)
-1 60
(1.22)

.9749
(.0867)
1.0441
(.1002)

- 3537
( 0859)
-.2708
( 0548)

.5477
(.1261)
.6028
(.1521)

.9400

.9478
(.0960)
9161
(.0890)
4756
(.0878)
.8755
(.0838)

-.1620
(.0468)
-.1452
(.0359)
-.4533
(.0626)
- .2746
(.0345)

3303
(.0800)
.2604
(.07877)
.6292
(.1146)
4005
(.0576)

.8649
(.1287)
.9579
(.1603)
.7369
(.2362)
.7735
(.1794)

- . 1008
( 0358)
-.1259
(.0741)
-.1206
(.0590)
-.1682
(.1126)

.1634
(.0682)
.3242
(.1786)
.3702
(.2242)
.3729
(.1838)

West South Central:
-.23
AR
(.99)
.52
LA
(.81)
OK
2.77
(-61)
TX
1.14
(.55)
Mountain:
MT
73
(.91)
-.53
ID
(1.26)
WY
.39
(1.44)
.78
CO
(1.12)

02

03

h

NM
AZ
UT
NV
Pacific:
WA
OR
CA

2.48
(.96)
328
(.84)
1 94
(107)
2 12
(1.34)

.5624
(.1514)
.6668
(.0932)
.7194
(.1633)
.7491
(.1707)

-.1095
(.0486)
-.2716
(.0482)
-.1225
(.0540)
-.2538
(.0750)

.2942
(.1038)
.3381
(.0788)
.1513
(.0795)
.5064
( 2053)

.7344

1.838

.5022

2.1979

.5650

.7894

2.003

.7385

.9849

-.0080

.6429

1 709

.0443

8404

1.1220

.8428

1.457

2.5787

2.2670

1.50
(82)
1.00
(.63)
1.90
(.75)

9298
(.0866)
.8992
(0643)
10190
(.1136)

-.2847
(.0476)
-.2064
(.0359)
-.4122
(.0734)

.2781
(.0594)
.2769
(.0548)
.3356
(.0625)

.8742

2593

3021

1 5591

-1.5630

.9410

1.236

.2833

1.0762

1.9260

8398

2.180

.1687

6.5694

- 5147

4.758

Estimated using three stage least squares Standard errors in parentheses R2 from a regression of actual unemployment on that forecast by the model
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growth and wage inflation, should sum to zero. These hypotheses about
the Fisher curve parameters cannot be rejected for the vast majority of
states in our sample.
Chi-square tests reject the null hypothesis that jS, = 1 at the 5 percent
level for just nine states: New York, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia,
South Carolina, Florida, Oklahoma, New Mexico, and Arizona. Since a
number of these states have experienced significant net migration during
the sample period (see Smith and Ahmed 1990), perhaps a coefficient on
£/,_, that is significantly below unity reflects the impact of lagged
unemployment on labor supply in the current period. If high unemploy
ment reduced net m-migration or speeded up net out-migration, we
might expect a subsequent drop in unemployment even if demand
growth and wage inflation were unchanged.
Chi-square tests reject the null hypothesis that j32 +j33 =0 at the five
percent level for nine states. In this case the states are Iowa, South
Dakota, Delaware, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma,
Texas, and New Mexico. Interestingly, the last six of these states are all
clustered together. Perhaps the Okun's law-cost-plus pricing rela
tionships are inappropriate for these economies with oil, other natural
resources, and agriculture as dominant industries. Still, our simple
unemployment rate equation emphasizing aggregate demand effects on
unemployment seems to fit the data quite well for most of the states.
The closeness of fit achieved by the Fisher curve equations is uni
formly good, as evidenced by the high determination coefficient at
tached to each regression. This is encouraging, since it means that the
ability of the model to make accurate within-sample forecasts of unem
ployment is strong.
In the case of the Fisher curve, the Durbin-Watson d test for residual
autocorrelation cannot legitimately be used, since this test is biased
when a lagged dependent variable appears on the right-hand side of the
estimated equation. We therefore use Durbin's h test in order to identify
any violations of the assumption of serial independence in the error
vector. The 1 and 5 percent critical values for this test are, respectively,
2.58 and 1.96. The h statistics reported in table 2.2 indicate that serial
correlation is not a widespread problem, although the h statistic is

Regional Wage Inflation and Unemployment 37

significant at the 5 percent level for some eight states. Only in the case of
Colorado is the serial correlation significant at 1 percent. We correct for
this problem in the Appendix.
The RESET statistics shown in table 2.2 indicate that the Fisher curve
is well specified in most cases. In four states, however, the RESET
statistic exceeds the 5 percent critical value. In two states —Idaho and
Wyoming—the RESET test is failed at 1 percent significance. It is
instructive to note that both these states produced low determination
coefficients in the Phillips curve estimates. The possibility that these two
problems are related will be investigated further at a later stage.
The Jarque-Bera test for off-white noise vectors may now be consid
ered. At the 5 percent level, this indicates that residuals are normally
distributed in all states but one-the exception is California. If the test is
repeated at 1 percent significance, the null hypothesis of normally
distributed residuals is accepted for all 48 states under consideration.
Hitherto, the suite of tests with which we have confronted the model
has consisted of tests on single coefficients or single equations. Further
statistical problems might conceivably arise, however, as a consequence
of interactions between the local economies of the 48 contiguous states.
The construction of a test to check for this possibility occupies the
remainder of the present section.
A large body of literature has in recent years grown around the
possibility that inflationary pressures are transmitted between regions
according to a stable and well-defined system of trails. The contribu
tions of Lesage and Reed (1989, 1990), Blackaby and Manning (1990),
and Hyclak and Johnes (1992) are relevant in this context. The central
ideas are not new, however; papers of an older vintage by Thirl wall
(1969, 1970) and Mackay and Hart (1975) concern similar issues.
In the present exercise, any attempt to establish the existence of
spatial transmission mechanisms for wage inflation is likely to be ren
dered difficult by the use of annual (rather than quarterly or monthly)
data. Nevertheless it is prudent to conduct a test for such mechanisms. If
a test indicates that some states or regions play the role of wage leaders,
correct specification of the Phillips curves for the remaining states
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would require the inclusion of leader-state inflation as an explanatory
variable.
Two methods are used in order to test the hypothesis that a spatial
wage transmission mechanism operates within the continental United
States. The first method involves comparing, on the one hand, the
correlation matrix associated with the 48 state-specific residual vectors
obtained from the 3SLS Phillips curve regressions, and on the other
hand, the 48th order identity matrix. These turn out to be very similar.
Ideally we would wish to conduct a chi-square test of homogeneity
between these two matrices, but the presence of many zeros in the
identity matrix would substantially weaken the power of any such test.
We have also used this method to check for the simultaneous existence
of spatial and temporal serial correlation. In the latter case the correla
tion matrix contains also the state-specific vectors of lagged noise terms,
and the corresponding identity matrix is of order 96. Again we found no
evidence to support the hypothesis that inflation is transmitted through
the states via an established mechanism.
In addition to the above broad brush procedure, extensive tests of the
wage transmission hypothesis have been conducted at the level of the
individual state. These experiments consisted of the insertion into the
Phillips curve of lagged wage inflation in contiguous states. These trials
met with limited success; the newly introduced term never turned out to
be statistically significant at conventional levels.
In this section the basic set of time series results has been obtained.
This includes estimates of the state-specific Phillips and Fisher curves.
In most states the model passes through our exacting series of tests with
flying colors. For a small minority of states, statistical checks indicate
that there may be difficulties caused by outlying or serially correlated
error terms, or by specification problems. In the Appendix we have
attempted to correct for the statistical problems identified for a handful
of states. The results of that exercise leave unchanged our basic results
on the spatial ^variation in the unemployment responsiveness of wage
inflation. Additionally, we have examined the sensitivity of our estimates
to differences in estimating methods and to the assumption that local
demand growth is exogenous. We find with these results, also reported
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in the Appendix, that our coefficient estimates, particularly those of a,,
are not materially affected by these changes. That said, the coefficient
estimates for all states appear sensible in that they accord with theory
and the overall performance of the model is very good indeed.

Metropolitan Areas
Hitherto, the analysis has concerned data collected at the level of the
state. In this section we investigate the performance of the basic model
when applied to data disaggregated to a finer level—that of the metro
politan area. The local labor market is, of course, the arena within
which the forces acting upon wages and unemployment operate. Given
the relatively small number of long distance commuters, it is wage (and
non-price) competition between local employers that determines the
allocation of labor (at least in the short run when migration cannot
occur). This being so, any satisfactory model of the labor market should
work well at the level of the local labor market.
The data requirements of our model can be satisfied over a fairly long
time period for most of the large metropolitan areas of the United States.
Annual Current Population Survey (CPS) estimates of unemployment
rates are available for 20 such areas over the period 1967-1986. Local
price indices for the same 20 local labor markets are available through
out this period from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and are published in
the Statistical Abstract . For all but four of these areas (Los Angeles, San
Francisco, Newark, and Pater son), a complete run of wage data is also
available. The wage data for the four remaining areas have not been
reported since 1980; unfortunately, therefore, the available information
provides insufficient degrees of freedom for us to estimate with confi
dence the parameters of the model in these cases. Consequently, our
attention will be focused upon the remaining 16 metropolitan areas.
In the absence of an official time series for the nominal Gross City
Product of individual metropolitan areas, we have proxied the rate of
growth of this variable by the rate of growth of the relevant Gross State
Product. In some cases, metropolitan areas cross state lines. Thus the
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Philadelphia area comprises parts of both Pennsylvania and New Jersey;
St. Louis straddles the Missouri and Illinois state line; MinneapolisSt. Paul bestrides the boundary between Minnesota and Wisconsin.
Other metropolitan areas include portions of three states. Cincinnati lies
in the tri-state area which comprises Ohio, Kentucky and Indiana; and
the nation's capital includes parts of Maryland and Virginia as well as the
whole of the District of Columbia. In all these cases we have proxied the
rate of growth of aggregate demand in the metropolitan area by the
weighted average rate of aggregate demand growth in all states within
which lie parts of the local labor market of interest.
Table 2.3 shows the estimated Phillips curve equations. These follow
much the same pattern as do the corresponding equations at the level of
the state. Interpreting the coefficient on unemployment as a measure of
wage flexibility, metropolitan areas in Maryland and Texas are charac
terised by relatively flexible wages, while those in the Northeast are
comparatively rigid. The coefficient on unemployment carries the ex
pected negative sign in all areas bar one, and is significantly different
from zero in most of these areas; the odd area out is Boston, where the
coefficient is insignificant. The coefficient on expected price inflation is
of reasonable magnitude in all areas, again with the single exception of
Boston.
The relatively poor performance of the equation for Boston suggests
that there may be a statistical problem here. This is confirmed by the
diagnostics; a significantly high RESET value implies the presence of
functional misspecification in the Boston area Phillips curve. The only
other problems identified by our diagnostics is the non-normal distribu
tion of the residuals in the Dallas-Fort Worth equation, and possibly also
in Washington DC. These problems are addressed in the Appendix.
The Fisher curve estimates for metropolitan areas appear in table 2.4.
The estimated coefficients generally have plausible magnitudes, and the
standard errors are, in general, low in relation to the means. Unemploy
ment persistence is to be observed to a marked degree in almost all
areas. Indeed, in 10 of the areas studied, the estimated coefficient on
lagged unemployment does not differ significantly from one at the 5
percent level. The parameter estimates generally indicate wage inflation
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Table 2.3 Phillips Curve Estimates, 16 Large SMSAs, 1964-86
w't - a0 + a i U't
Area
New York
Chicago
Philadelphia
Detroit
Boston
Washington
Pittsburgh
St Louis
Cleveland
Baltimore
Dallas-Fort
Worth
Houston
Milwaukee
MmneapohsSt. Paul
Cincinnati
Buffalo

«o

«i

«2

4.02
(.68)
3.27
(.69)
4.50
(.95)
4.82
(1.04)
3.92
(.61)
8.27
(4.69)
4.03
(1.38)
4.02
(0.82)
4.38
(1.14)
6.01
(1.41)
4.98
(154)
4.57
(1.22)
4.14
(0.58)
2 82
(.94)
298
(1.03)
2.64
(1.44)

-.30
(.14)
-.26
(.12)
-.44
(.24)
-.52
(.18)
.03
(15)
-2.92
(204)
- 62
(-18)
-.32
(.17)
-.58
(.21)
-1.38
(.42)
-.95
(43)
- 84
(20)
-.69
(.11)
- 22
(.26)
-.30
(-18)
-.06
(24)

.72
(.12)
.82
(.12)
.86
(.18)
1.16
(.24)
41
(.10)
1.78
(81)
1 18
(.19)
.82
(.13)
1 02
(.20)
1.54
(29)
1 03
(.17)
1 14
(.14)
1.12
(10)
84
(14)
1.01
(19)
.80
(24)

R2

d

RESET

JarqueBera

.72

1.95

1.44

1.24

.67

1.72

036

1 90

63

1.52

0.27

1 52

.58

1.86

0.50

1 47

54

1.18

9.36

1 10

.12

1.38

0.92

7.51

.64

1.86

3.91

3.90

.69

1 36

2.57

0.68

62

2.06

0.30

1.64

.65

1.47

1.06

076

62

2.20

0.40

13.53

82

2.56

0.16

1.24

.86

2.08

1.89

0.99

72

1.14

1.15

074

56

1 82

3.65

058

.42

1.26

1.53

0.40

Standard errors in parentheses Estimated using three stage least squares R2 refers to that
generated by a regression of actual on forecast values derived from static, in-sample forecasts of W,
and£7,
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and demand growth coefficients which lie within a plausible range; the
only exception is Washington DC, where the coefficient on wage infla
tion is somewhat lower than expected. The diagnostic tests also high
light Washington as an area where the Fisher curve may run into
statistical problems. The RESET statistic is significantly high, thus
pointing to possible misspecification of the function. This misspecification may, of course, be related to the presence of outlying residuals
observed in this area's Phillips curve. In addition, two areas have Fisher
curves plagued by serial correlation of the residuals, as evidenced by
Durbin's h statistic. These areas are Detroit and Minneapolis-St. Paul.
In table 2.5 we report estimates of the Phillips curve for the 15 large
metropolitan areas in which the lagged rate of consumer price inflation
is measured with local Consumer Price Indexes (CPI) rather than the
national Personal Consumption Expenditures Deflator (PCED). The
effect of this change on the estimated coefficients is quite marked. The
estimates of a, are generally lower in magnitude and smaller relative to
the standard errors in table 2.5 in comparison with the results in table
2.3. Use of the local CPI data also results in lower estimates of the
coefficient on lagged price inflation and lower Durbin-Watson statistics,
suggesting the presence of serial correlation in the residuals.
Measurement error in the CPI, related to the treatment of mortgage
interest rates prior to 1983, has led Gordon (1990b), among others, to
conclude that the PCED is a more accurate measure of consumer price
inflation than the CPI, particularly for the 1970s. The fact that the
PCED is not available for regions or states does not appear to be a
serious problem. Evidence that local wage-setting is based on national
price inflation can be seen in the fact reported in Basic Patterns in Union
Contracts (1983) that just 9 percent of collective bargaining agreements
with cost of living adjustments in 1983 used local price indexes in the
adjustment formula, while 88 percent used national price indexes. As a
result, we present the results with local price indexes only for com
parative purpose.
The results presented in this section serve to demonstrate that the twoequation model accurately explains labor market behavior at a finely
disaggregated level. The qualitative conclusions drawn from the study
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Table 2.4 Fisher Curve Estimates, 16 Large SMSAs, 1964-86

Area
New York

00

-.06
( 83)
Chicago
1.14
(.71)
Philadelphia - 30
(.75)
Detroit
1.38
(.73)
Boston
.59
(1.01)
Washington
76
(.94)
Pittsburgh
2.44
(1.06)
St. Louis
.94
(.89)
Cleveland
1.63
(.62)
Baltimore
4 10
(1.07)
Dallas1.24
Ft. Worth
(92)
Houston
1.80
(.78)
Milwaukee
108
(.63)
Minneapolis- 1.01
St Paul
(.70)
Cincinnati
.07
(1.70)
Buffalo
.52
________(164)

0,

/32

87
( 07)
88
(.06)
.88
(07)
.89
(.06)
.78
(.10)
.82
(.12)
1.02
(.08)
.81
(.09)
.88
(06)
77
(.08)
.61
(.17)
97
(.11)
94
( 06)
72
(10)
.88
(.06)
.74
(12)

-21
(.08)
-.34
(05)
-.26
(08)
-.38
(.04)
-.36
(.08)
-.09
(.10)
-.62
(.11)
-26
(.08)
-.38
(06)
-.47
(.10)
- 20
(.05)
-.44
(.06)
-.38
( 06)
-.22
( 05)
-.24
(.05)
-.09
(18)

j33

R2

h

RESET

JarqueBera

45 .93
1.19 0.26
1.24
( 10)
.37 96 -196 122
2.03
(07)
.48 .92 -1 86 0.15
1.03
(.08)
.36 .93 -297 0.09
0.92
(.09)
.58 .87 -1.15 0.18
1.17
( 16)
14 .85
647
090
(.05)
.36 .92
1.76 4.31
0.50
(.08)
.36 .85 -1.46 0.57
002
(.10)
.33 .90
-.84 0.06
1.80
(08)
.27 88
0 16
0.60
(.07)
.37 79
2.40
1 92
(10)
.52 .87
552
075
(10)
38 .93 -160 0.12
012
( 07)
.34 .80 -1158 0.34
1.04
(07)
.43 .94 -120 0.46
0.22
(.08)
.38 .79
1.78 324
0.82
(16)__________________

Standard errors in parentheses The h statistic could not be computed for Washington, Baltimore,
Dallas-Ft Worth and Houston The Durbm-Watson statistics for these areas are, respectively,
1 78, 2 32, 1 74, and 2 34
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Table 2.5

Phillips Curve Estimates, 15 Large SMSAs, 1964-1986,
Using Local Price Data
w' = do + ctiU' + Oi2p't- i

Area
New York

«0

3.36
(.60)
Chicago
4.29
(.76)
Philadelphia
4.00
(99)
Detroit
5 13
(1.17)
Boston
3.81
(.64)
Washington, DC 4.67
(4.07)
Pittsburgh
5.23
(1.64)
St. Louis
4.44
(.99)
Cleveland
6.01
(1.22)
Baltimore
5.06
(1.42)
Houston
5.16
(1.05)
Milwaukee
5.50
(.69)
Minneapolis2.96
St Paul
(1.10)
Cincinnati
378
(1.06)
Buffalo
245
__________(1.55)

^
-.22
(.11)
-26
(.14)
-.10
(.20)
- 22
(.16)
.14
(.14)
-97
(1.54)
-.53
(.22)
-.19
(.20)
-.73
(25)
- 66
(.35)
-.71
(14)
- 65
( 14)
04
(.29)
-22
(.18)
08
(.24)

a2

R2

d

RESET

JarqueBera

.72
.75 2.16
317
1.98
(.09)
59 .60 1.15
332
2.22
(.10)
.53
.53 1 16
.41
1.61
(13)
58
42 1 30
.77
1 54
(.17)
.29
48 1.11
7.09
1.27
(.08)
92
.09 1.30
.67
8.52
(.55)
.77 .52 1.43
1.33
1.45
(.18)
.54 .56
.79
1.13
.32
(.11)
79 .54 140
.11
1.30
(.16)
.88 .54 1.02
1.05
1.81
(19)
.82 .84 2.39
.41
.98
(.08)
.75
.83 1.07
3.06
.68
( 08)
.54 .59
.90
.24
.61
(.12)
.69 .52 1.67
2.51
1.25
(.15)
58
33 131
.25
1.73
(.22)___________________

Estimated using three stage least squares Standard errors in parentheses
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of the metropolitan areas confirm many of the trends observed when
investigating the states. Wages appear to be relatively inflexible in the
urban areas of the Northeast, and relatively flexible in the Texan cities;
these results mirror the conclusions drawn when analyzing state-level
data.

Simulations
In order to illustrate the effect of wage flexibility on regional labor
market performance, we have carried out two sets of simulations using
the state labor market models reported in tables 2.1 and 2.2. One
simulation examines the cyclical behavior of state labor markets by
forecasting the wage inflation and unemployment rates in each state for
the 1980s under the assumption that state demand growth equaled
national GNP growth for each year in that decade. The second simula
tion assesses the long-run wage inflation and unemployment responses
to different growth rates in Gross State Product. Our purpose in this
endeavor is to determine if the cyclical and long-run performance of
regional labor markets is related to the degree of wage flexibility across
the 48 states.
Table 2.6 presents summary statistics from the business cycle simula
tions for the five states with the highest degree of wage flexibility and the
five states with the smallest wage flexibility coefficients. We measure
wage flexibility by the negative of a,, the unemployment coefficient in
the Phillips curve. It is important to emphasize that the results in table
2.6 are obtained by using the same values of >> and/? for each state. Thus
the forecasts for the 1980s differ across states only because of differ
ences in the parameters of the Phillips and Fisher curves and because of
differences in 1979 unemployment rates.
Some interesting contrasts between the high- and low-wage flexibility
states are evident in table 2.6. The simulations indicate that the highwage flexibility states would have had a slightly lower mean wage
inflation rate and a substantially greater variance in wage inflation rates
than the low flexibility states under the cyclical conditions represented
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Table 2.6 Summary Statistics for Selected States
of the Results of a Simulation of the 1980s
Wage Inflation
Mean Variance

Unemployment
Mean Variance

High Flexibility States:
North Dakota
South Dakota
Nebraska
Utah
Maryland

562
499
5 85
5.72
5.24

9.14
9.47
7.45
10.21
8.27

4.69
4.21
4.13
6.24
6.13

.06
.16
.34
.24
1.34

Low Flexibility States:
Rhode Island
Mississippi
Massachusetts
New York
New Jersey

6.08
5.90
6.30
6.32
6.20

3.38
4.36
2.70
3.55
4.80

6.92
9.68
7.26
7.44
8.85

241
1.34
.86
1.49
1.24

This simulation involved a dynamic forecast of unemployment and inflation for each year from
1980 to 1989, assuming that state GSP growth was equal to GNP growth

by national demand growth and consumer price inflation in the United
States during the 1980s. Interestingly, the results also predict a lower
mean unemployment rate with much smaller annual variation in the
unemployment rate for the high-wage flexibility states under the same
conditions.
The contrasts evident for the 10 states in table 2.6 are confirmed by
correlations across all 48 states. The correlation coefficient between
wage flexibility and the mean wage inflation rate generated by the 1980s
simulation is — .43 while the correlation between wage flexibility and
the variance of wage inflation is +.44. The correlation coefficients
across the 48 states between wage flexibility and the mean and variance
of the simulated unemployment rate are — .56 and — .50, respectively.
All four correlation coefficients are statistically significant at the 5
percent level.
The results from this first simulation exercise suggest that states with
greater wage flexibility have greater variation in wage inflation rates
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over the business cycle but, on average, lower wage inflation rates and
unemployment rates than states with low degrees of flexibility. There is
also an indication that the business cycle, as measured by the variance of
the unemployment rate, is less pronounced in states with high degrees of
wage flexibility. Obviously the correlations reported here do not prove
causation; however, there is evidence that wage flexibility improves
labor market performance on a number of important dimensions.
Since the business cycle simulations used the GNP growth rate for all
states to facilitate comparisons, we can also use the results of those
simulations to ask what would be the effect on local and national
unemployment if regional policy were able to equalize the growth of
demand across all regions. An answer to that question is presented in
table 2.7, which reports simulated and actual unemployment rates for
each state for 1982 and 1986. The simulated unemployment rates are
those predicted by our labor market model, assuming that demand
growth equaled the national average in all states. Thus they give us a clue
as to how unemployment rate patterns might respond to a redistribution
of demand from high-growth states to slow-growth states.
The results of this exercise indicate that such a redistribution would
have fairly large effects on individual states and census regions. For
example, growth at the national average would have resulted in signifi
cantly higher unemployment rates for all the northeastern states except
Pennsylvania in both 1982 and 1986. In contrast, lower unemployment
rates would have been registered in most of the Central states if regional
demand growth had increased at a pace equivalent to the rate of growth
of GNR This is certainly consistent with the perception of a sharp
disparity in economic performance during the 1980s between the East
Coast and the heartland of the country.
An interesting pattern emerges in the results reported for the West
South Central and Mountain regions. For most of these states, demand
growth at the national rate would have resulted in higher unemployment
rates in 1982 and lower rates in 1986. This largely reflects changes in the
markets for oil and other raw materials affecting the growth in Gross
State Product in these regions. Finally, the results for the South Atlantic
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Table 2.7 A Comparison of Actual Unemployment Rates
to Those Forecast Under the Assumption of Uniform Demand Growth
Across all States, 1982 and 1986
1982
Forecast
Actual
New England
Maine
New Hampshire
Vermont
Massachusetts
Connecticut
Rhode Island
Middle Atlantic
Pennsylvania
New York
New Jersey
East North Central
Ohio
Indiana
Illinois
Michigan
Wisconsin
West North Central
Minnesota
Iowa
Missouri
North Dakota
South Dakota
Nebraska
Kansas
South Atlantic
Delaware
Maryland
Virginia
West Virginia
North Carolina
South Carolina
Georgia
Florida

1986
Forecast
Actual

10.8
9.6
8.4
9.0
8.3
9.9

8.6
74
6.9
7.9
69
10.2

7.7
7.8
6.8
7.4
7.8
6.2

5.3
2.8
47
3.8
3.8
4.0

10.2
90
109

10.9
8.6
9.0

67
69
9.0

6.8
6.3
5.0

10.1
9.7
9.1
11 9
90

12.5
11 9
11.3
15.5
10.4

7.0
6.2
6.8
8.3
6.1

8 1
67
8.1
8.8
70

7.0
7.0
8.1
48
4.8
52
62

7.8
8.5
9.2
59
5.5
6.1
63

5.2
5.3
6.2
4.1
4.1
3.9
4.6

5.3
7.0
6.1
6.3
4.7
50
54

97
8.2
7.8
12.2
94
97
9.0
10.4

8.5
8.4
77
13.9
90
10.8
7.8
8.2

5.2
5.4
5.5
8.6
7.2
6.2
8.9
7.0

43
45
5.5
11.8
5 3
7.5
5.9
5.7
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Table 2.7

(continued)

1982
Forecast
Actual
East South Central
Kentucky
Tennessee
Alabama
Mississippi
West South Central
Arkansas
Louisiana
Oklahoma
Texas
Mountain
Montana
Idaho
Wyoming
Colorado
New Mexico
Arizona
Utah
Nevada
Pacific
Washington
Oregon
California
Weighted Average

1986
Forecast
Actual

97
107
127
11 3

10.6
11.8
13.7
11.0

7.5
82
9.9
99

9.3
8.0
9.8
11 7

100
108
89
9 1

9.8
10.3
5.7
6.9

7.5
9.5
5.2
6.5

8.7
13.1
8.2
8.9

7.4
8.5
68
82
106
10.8
72
10.6

8.6
9.8
5.8
7.7
9.2
9.9
7.8
10.1

6.6
6.8
5.0
5.4
7.3
76
6.2
7.8

8.6
87
9.0
74
92
6.9
60
10.1

11.5
10.7
8.6

12.1
11.5
99

9.1
7.8
10.0

8.2
8.5
6.7

9.4

97

7.4

70

and Pacific regions are mixed, with some states benefitting and others
losing from an equalization of demand growth.
When the state unemployment rates are averaged using labor force
weights, we see that demand growth equalization would have had a
minor effect on the national unemployment rate. The simulated rate for
1982 is 0.3 points lower and that for 1986 0.4 points higher than the
actual rates for those years. This suggests the possibility that eliminating
regional disparities in demand growth might smooth out slightly the
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Table 2.8 Demand Growth Multipliers, Selected States
Wage Inflation

Unemployment

High Flexibility States:
North Dakota
South Dakota
Nebraska
Utah
Maryland

.26
22
.39
.34
.55

-.09
- 09
-.26
-.18
-.38

Low Flexibility States:
Rhode Island
Mississippi
Massachusetts
New York
New Jersey

.26
.31
.16
06
.12

- 72
- 84
-1 23
-.66
-1.52

The multipliers equal the difference between 1991 dynamic forecasts assuming y = 8% and/? = 5%
for each year from 1987 to 1991 and 1991 forecasts assuming y =7 % and p = 5 % for each year from
1987 to 1991

cyclical pattern of unemployment rates at the national level while having
fairly large impacts on individual states. A more complete model,
expanded to include the determination of regional price inflation, would
be necessary to study the effects of demand growth equalization on
national inflation. The estimation of such a model would require new
data on regional prices.
Our second set of simulations addresses the longer-term effect of
demand growth on unemployment rates and wage inflation. To estimate
this we developed two sets of forecasts for each state for the 1987-1991
period. The first assumed y= 8 percent and p = 5 percent for each state in
each of those years and the second assumed y=l percent and p=5
percent for each of those years. From the 1991 forecasts derived in this
manner, we can calculate "multipliers" measuring the effect of 8 percent
demand growth versus 7 percent demand growth on wage inflation and
unemployment. Such multipliers are reported in table 2.8 for the states
at the high and low end of the wage flexibility spectrum.
The results in table 2.8 suggest that the unemployment rate impact of
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faster demand growth is substantially higher for the low-wage flexibility
states. Across all 48 states, the correlation coefficient between wage
flexibility and the unemployment multiplier, measured in absolute value
terms, is .55. Interestingly, there is no significant correlation (r=.24)
between wage flexibility and the wage inflation multiplier. The results
from this growth simulation need to be considered with particular care
since migration responses, which are neglected by our model, are likely
to be more important over longer time horizons.

Conclusions
Economists brought up in the neoclassical tradition have strong ideas
about what constitutes a perfect world. Information is complete, trans
actions and mobility are costless, restrictions on economic activity are
absent, and markets exist for everything. Within such a perfect world,
the operation of an economy is well understood; outside it, controversy
persists. Disagreements therefore arise frequently when markets do not
(appear to) work. Surpluses and gluts are blemishes; they may cure
themselves quickly, or they may indicate that treatment is required
(either to restore perfect market conditions or to compensate for chron
ically imperfect ones).
Unemployment occurs when the market for labor fails to clear a
surplus. Its persistence is therefore a source of much disagreement
among economists. The sluggish supply-side behavior embodied in the
traditional (short-run) Phillips curve matches the eclectic Keynesian
view of markets which do not always clear. According to this model, a
tradeoff exists (in the short run at least) between inflation and unemploy
ment. Such a view has faced a stern challenge over the last 20 years, both
from the theoretical advances achieved by the new classical school and
from the empirical observation of worldwide stagflation in the wake of
the oil shocks of the seventies. As a result, naive models of the Phillips
curve have been swept aside, to be replaced by more sophisticated
systems. It has become clear that when changes in price expectations
influence labor supply decisions (and so buffet about the Phillips curve),
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the path pursued by the economy depends also on the shape of aggregate
demand. The wage-employment solution arrived at in any period de
pends, therefore, on both aggregate supply and aggregate demand
conditions.
In this chapter, the simultaneous determination of wage inflation and
unemployment has been captured by way of a simple two-equation
model. The first equation is the familiar expectations-augmented Phil
lips curve. This is based on the optimal response to labor market
conditions and expected price changes on the part of workers supplying
labor services. The second equation derives from the early work of
Irving Fisher, and represents the unemployment effects of changes on
the demand side of the economy; we have called this the Fisher curve.
Together, the Phillips and Fisher curves describe the movement of wage
inflation and unemployment rates over the business cycle.
When applying an identical model to a large number of small econo
mies, some problems and local idiosyncracies are sure to arise. It has
been a matter of surprise to us that so few difficulties have arisen out of
our choice of an exceedingly simple model. In the large majority of
states and metropolitan areas, the model works very satisfactorily
indeed. The coefficients have the signs and magnitudes predicted by
theory, and the model passes a tough series of diagnostic tests designed
to highlight statistical difficulties. In the few states and cities where
statistical problems were identified, these have been bypassed using
standard methods. For these areas, the corrected functions once more
produce reasonable coefficient estimates and a good fit to the data. The
within-sample predictive power of the model is good in all states and
cities and, while the data series are not sufficiently long to allow rigorous
testing of out-of-sample properties, our work on national data (Hyclak
and Johnes 1990) indicates that the model works well in this respect too.
Of central interest in the context of this book is the coefficient on
unemployment in the state-specific Phillips curves. This enables us to
derive a measure of wage flexibility which will be used extensively in the
next chapter as we seek to establish the determinants of wage rigidity. A
quick glance at the unemployment coefficients of the state-specific
Phillips curves is sufficient to establish that spatial variation in wage
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flexibility is present. Some broad trends are immediately apparent.
Wages tend to be less flexible in the Northeast than elsewhere, and are
especially flexible in the northern plains and the Pacific Northwest. A
more detailed consideration of these patterns will form the basis of the
next chapter.

Inter-Regional Differences in Wage
Flexibility
A glance at figure 2.1 reinforces a central conclusion of the preceding
chapter: the unemployment responsiveness of manufacturing wage in
flation varies quite considerably across the 48 states. The purpose of this
chapter is to attempt an empirical explanation of these interstate differ
ences in wage flexibility.
Our method follows that of Kaun and Spiro (1970) and Grubb,
Jackman, and Layard (1983) in using the state-specific estimates of the
unemployment coefficient from the Phillips curve as the dependent
variable in a cross-section analysis. Our sample of 48 states allows for
considerably more degrees of freedom than these previous studies and
gives us the advantage of conducting a cross-section analysis within a
common legal and regulatory environment, unlike studies of interna
tional differences in wage flexibility. The independent variables in the
cross-section analysis are derived from hypotheses developed in recent
theoretical models of wage rigidity.
This chapter is organized in the following manner. The first section
presents a brief review of recent theories of wage rigidity, followed by a
definition of the specific hypotheses and variables we will test in the
cross-state regressions and discussion of data sources. Results of the
basic regression analysis are presented in the third section and in the
fourth we extend the cross-section model to consider simultaneous
equations issues. The chapter concludes with a brief summary of the
results.
Theories of Wage Rigidity
Given the central importance of wage and price rigidity in most
macroeconomic models, it is not surprising that there has been a
55
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considerable number of theories of wage rigidity offered in the literature
in recent years. Two broad approaches can be identified: The new
classical economics emphasizes an equilibrium approach which treats
apparent wage rigidity as the result of "flat" labor supply curves reflect
ing intertemporal labor-leisure tradeoffs, transactions costs, or changes
in the reservation wage of marginal workers. An alternative method has
been to emphasize the various characteristics of labor markets that
generate significant and persistent disequilibrium wage outcomes.
Careful reviews of wage rigidity theories by Kmesner and Goldsmith
(1987) and Blanchard and Fischer (1989) cast considerable doubt on the
applicability of the equilibrium approach to understanding why labor
demand shocks affect employment to a much greater degree than wages.
As a result, three related disequilibrium theories, which have received
considerable attention in recent years, will be the focus of our empirical
analysis of interstate differences in wage flexibility. These are contract
theory, efficiency wage theory and the insider-outsider theory. In addi
tion to reviewing each of these theories below, we also examine the way
in which state labor policies might affect wage flexibility.
Contract Theory
Here we refer to two separate theories: the implicit contract theory,
first formalized by Azariadis (1975) and Baily (1974), and the theory of
staggered, overlapping union contracts developed by Okun (1981) and
Taylor (1979). In both cases, wages are rigid in the face of a labor
market shock because they have been contractually fixed. In the simple
implicit contract theory, firms and workers are viewed as entering into
voluntary agreements in which risk-neutral firms guarantee risk-averse
workers a degree of income stability in the face of uncertainty about the
future state of labor demand. These unwritten contracts may result in
steady real wages regardless of the level of labor demand, with workers
paying for such real wage insurance by accepting a lower average real
wage over time than would be generated by a competitive labor market.
While this theory offers an explanation for wage rigidity, it falters in its
implications for employment changes and does not provide an explana-
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tion for the absence of contingency contracts that offer stable employ
ment levels. A second version of implicit contract theory (Grossman and
Hart 1981) relies on the assumption that the firm has better information
about the state of the labor market and, hence, has the opportunity to
gain by misrepresenting the true state. Under this condition, risk-averse
workers gain by an implicit contract fixing the real wage and letting the
firm choose employment.
Implicit contract theory has been criticized because it provides a
rationale for fixed income contracts rather than the fixed-wage variable
employment contracts that seem to dominate the labor market (Gordon
1990a) and because it fails to explain the less than full indexation of
wages observed in the economy (Kmesner and Goldsmith 1987). How
ever, it is a practical matter that makes this theory of little use in our
analysis of the determinants of interstate differences in wage rigidity.
While it is possible that states differ in the extent to which workers and
firms enter into wage-fixing implicit contracts, the theory provides no
guidance as to how this might be measured in practice. This is amply
illustrated by the fact that such contracts are not written and are some
how reached by consensus without explicit negotiations. And it is
difficult to conceive of appropriate statistical counterparts to the degree
of risk aversion and information asymmetries in a regional labor market.
Thus, while the theory provides a rationale for the existence of observed
wage rigidity, it does not provide an operational hypothesis to use in our
analysis.
The second contract-based theory of wage rigidity starts from the
observation that in the union sector of the U.S. labor market contracts
are generally negotiated at the plant level, usually are in effect for more
than one year, have staggered starting and ending dates, and specify
periodic wage adjustments, often explicitly linked to price inflation,
over the contract life. Rigidity is built into union wages by the inertia
created when some portion of current nominal wage adjustments are
affected by expectations and labor market conditions prevailing during
contract negotiations a year or more in the past. Employment instability
results from unexpected price inflation or demand shocks during the
term of the multiyear contract. Card's (1990) study of union contracts in
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Canada provides considerable empirical support for these hypotheses.
He found that nominal wage contracting in multiyear pacts led to
unexpected changes in real wages that played an important role in
explaining cyclical movements in union employment. He also found that
unexpected real wage changes tended to be carried over into the next
agreement, suggesting that inertia in the union sector may prevail over
several contract periods.
Union contract theory takes as given the institutional framework for
collective bargaining in the United States and does not explain why
contracts set wage levels rather than employment or why wages are not
linked to the performance of the firm or the economy in a way that
stabilizes employment (Gordon 1990a). And in the United States,
unions represent a fairly small fraction of the workforce. Still, the
potential importance of wage rigidity caused by union contracts sug
gests that some measure of union activity be included among the inde
pendent variables in our cross-section analysis. This conclusion is also
indicated by the empirical studies of Kaun and Spiro (1970), who found
a negative relationship between an index of union density and the
unemployment coefficient from time series Phillips curve estimates in a
cross-section of 30 metropolitan areas, and Mitchell (1980), whose
results showed significantly lower wage flexibility in more heavily
unionized industries. Thus, one hypothesis for this chapter is that the
extent of union contract coverage will be negatively related to wage
flexibility across the states.

Efficiency Wage Theory
The basic hypothesis of efficiency wage theory is that firms may find it
advantageous to pay wages in excess of market-clearing levels if worker
efficiency is positively related to compensation. More important for our
purposes, efficiency considerations would lead a firm to resist cutting
wages even in the face of substantial excess labor supply because cutting
wages might lower productivity and actually raise labor costs. Katz's
(1986) review of the efficiency wage literature identified five distinct, yet
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complementary, explanations for a positive relationship between worker
efficiency and the wage level:
(1) Paying above-market wages raises the cost of losing a job and hence
acts as a deterrent to shirking in jobs where close monitoring of
worker performance is impossible
(2) Efficiency wages lower turnover costs to the extent that they result in
lower quit rates and increased tenure.
(3) Paying above market wages serves to increase the overall quality of
the pool of job applicants, and maintaining wage levels in a downturn
lowers the risk of losing the firm's best, most mobile workers.
(4) If the wage standard is perceived to be fair, then greater worker
morale and loyalty might enhance effort and productivity and facili
tate teamwork.
(5) Higher than required wages may be used to secure industrial peace in
unionized establishments or to forestall union organization in nonu
nion firms

The appeal of efficiency wage theory is that it not only provides an
explanation for wage rigidity and employment variability over the busi
ness cycle, but it also yields results that are consistent with a number of
labor market situations that have proven anomalous for competitive
labor theory. For example, if the conditions leading to efficiency wage
gains vary with the size, technology, or profitability of the firm, then
efficiency wage considerations can be used to explain the existence of
wage differentials across firms or industries for similar workers. And
efficiency wage theory is consistent with the observed dual nature of
U.S. labor markets, with a sector of competitive low-wage employers,
for whom efficiency wage factors may not be important, coexisting with
a sector of employers paying high wages and providing long-term career
opportunities.
While it is safe to say that efficiency wage theory has had a great
appeal to many economists in recent years, there have been several
criticisms leveled against this approach. The recent papers by Carmichael (1990) and Lang and Kahn (1990) present a detailed discussion
of the pros and cons of the theory. To summarize, there appear to be
three main critiques: First, it is argued that the wage is performing both
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an allocative and an incentive task in efficiency wage theory, and that
other mechanisms, such as performance bonuses, piece rates, or tourna
ments, would perform better in regulating the intensity of work effort.
The absence of widespread use of such mechanisms appears to call into
question the importance of efficiency considerations. Second, since a
prominent version of efficiency wage theory relies partially on the threat
of unemployment as a deterrent to shirking, it is argued that the theory
cannot explain involuntary unemployment since such unemployment is
assumed to be exogenous in the formulation of a firm's wage policy
(Barro 1989). And third, it is argued that efficiency wage theory alone
cannot fully explain wage rigidity without being coupled with an explicit
recognition of the coordination problems inherent in reducing wages at
one firm when relative wages are important (Gordon 1990a).
Thus far the empirical evidence on the efficiency wage hypothesis has
been mostly indirect (Krueger and Summers 1988). However, a recent
paper by Blinder and Choi (1990) reports the results of a small interview
survey of personnel managers and many of their findings seem to be
consistent with the efficiency wage hypothesis. In particular, a large
proportion of the managers interviewed agreed that wage cuts would
lower work effort, increase quits, and impose significant hiring and
training costs on the firm. And there seemed to be general agreement
that the firm risked significant costs from being perceived as pursuing an
"unfair" wage policy. A second hypothesis to consider in our analysis,
then, is that wage flexibility will be negatively related to the relative
importance of efficiency wage policies across the states.
Insider-Outsider Theory
The insider-outsider theory, developed principally by Lindbeck and
Snower (1988), has received considerable attention as an explanation for
wage and price rigidity in the face of extremely high unemployment
rates in most European countries during the 1980s. This hypothesis
starts with the idea that insiders, currently employed or temporarily
laid-off workers, are imperfect substitutes for outsiders, those who have
not recently worked for the firm. Thus it may not be profitable for a firm
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to hire unemployed workers at lower wages because of an array of firing,
hiring, and training costs. These costs enable insiders, especially when
represented by unions, to extract a rent from the employer in the form of
higher than competitive wages that generally are cyclically inflexible.
Unemployment results even though outsiders are willing to accept jobs
at lower wages than insiders as long as the wage differential paid to
insiders does not exceed the turnover costs. In addition to offering an
explanation for wage rigidity and involuntary unemployment, insideroutsider theory has been used to explain hysteresis in the equilibrium
unemployment rate. A shock that lowers employment and increases the
number of outsiders may lead to an increase in the equilibrium unem
ployment rate if wage levels are predominantly determined in the best
interest of the employed insiders rather than reflecting excess supply
conditions in the labor market as a whole.
Krueger and Summers (1988, p.280) regard the insider-outsider
model as "... a species of efficiency wage theory rather than as an
alternative explanation for wage differentials." Therefore, many of the
criticisms outlined above also apply to this model. In addition, the
theory provides no clear rationale why two-tier wage systems, in which
above-market wages are paid to insiders and market-level wages are paid
to new hires, would not be employed. The widespread use of such
systems along with concession bargaining in the United States in the
1980s (Flanagan 1984) would seem to call into question some of the
basic tenets of insider-outsider theory, at least as applied to the United
States. However, there are two specific hypotheses derived from the
insider-outsider model that need to be included in our analysis of
interstate differences in wage flexibility. The first hypothesis is that wage
flexibility is inversely related to the extent of long-term unemployment.
The argument here is that workers who have been unemployed for long
periods of time undergo a deterioration in their skills that makes them
outsiders from the point of view of firm wage policy. The second
hypothesis is that wage inflation is more responsive to changes m
unemployment via layoffs than to the level of unemployment. This is
because unions are responsive to both the wage and employment pros-
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pects of their members and are more likely to moderate wage demands
when faced with an increase in job losses for their members.
The notion that layoffs might have a bigger impact on wage adjust
ments than the level of unemployment also seems to fit efficiency wage
models based on the relationship between work effort and the perceived
fairness of wages (Akerlof and Yellen 1990). The survey results of
Blinder and Choi (1990) indicated agreement among personnel manag
ers that wage cuts in response to decreased labor demand could be
implemented without an adverse effort response if such cuts could be
justified to the workers as fair. Such justification could be based on the
need to align wages with those of competitors, since wage comparisons
are likely to be a major criterion in assessing fairness, or the need to help
the firm weather a particularly serious competitive threat.
Public Policy
Chan-Lee, Coe, and Prywes (1987) examine a number of government
policies that potentially affect the responsiveness of labor markets to
economic shocks. They cite four general types of government policies in
this regard: minimum wage levels, unemployment compensation re
placement and coverage rates, public sector pay policies, and general
regulations of labor relations. They find no empirical evidence to sup
port the notion that liberalization of such policies, which has happened
in a number of European countries during the 1980s, had a significant
effect on the responsiveness of wage inflation to unemployment. Still,
our cross-state analysis considers the impact of three policy variables on
wage flexibility.
The minimum wage can affect wage flexibility by insulating the wages
of covered workers from market forces. In a cross-state analysis, those
regions where minimum wages are relatively more important should
exhibit greater wage rigidity. However, it has been argued that in the
United States the labor market effect of the minimum wage has been
limited because the vast majority of workers earn wages in excess of the
minimum level, there are substantial gaps in coverage, the real value of
the minimum wage drops considerably in years between legislated
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changes, and there is substantial employer noncompliance (Brown
1988). Our empirical analysis addresses the effect of the minimum wage
on wage flexibility by including a measure of the relative minimum wage
in the regressions.
While Katz (1986) argues that the level and availability of unemploy
ment insurance benefits might have an effect on the level of efficiency
wages required to inhibit shirking, there is no clear hypothesis in the
literature to suggest that unemployment insurance would directly affect
the responsiveness of wage inflation to unemployment. Such benefits
may have an indirect impact, however, given the evidence of significant
unemployment compensation effects on the willingness of firms to use
temporary layoffs (Topel 1983) and on the duration of unemployment
(Ehrenberg and Oaxaca 1976). In addition, research by Katz (1977) and
Johnson, Dickinson and West (1985) suggests that referrals from the
Public Employment Service may act to reduce the duration of unem
ployment by shortening the period of job search for some workers. We
examine the indirect effect of the unemployment insurance and public
employment systems in the simultaneous equations model discussed
later in this chapter.
As a measure of the overall public policy toward labor-management
relations in a state, we focus on whether or not a state has adopted a
"right-to-work" law. While the literal significance of these laws is that
unions are prohibited from negotiating compulsory membership re
quirements into collective agreements, their true significance lies as an
indicator of the overall "bias" in state policy regarding labormanagement relations. In this regard, right-to-work laws are often used
in measures of the "business climate" of a state. A recent survey of the
literature on right-to-work laws by Moore and Newman (1985) indicates
that there is some evidence, although not overwhelming evidence, that
such laws, or the tastes of the citizenry reflected through such laws, have
the effect of reducing union membership and bargaining power. Since
union bargaining power plays an important role in contract theory and
the insider-outsider hypothesis, it might be expected that greater wage
flexibility would be observed in states affected by right-to-work laws.
In summary, our reading of the recent theoretical approaches to
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explaining wage flexibility suggests the following hypotheses: (1) wage
flexibility will be lower in states where a greater proportion of workers
are covered by union contracts; (2) wage flexibility will be lower m
states where employers make greater use of efficiency wages; (3) wage
flexibility will be lower in states with a larger fraction of long-term
unemployed workers; and (4) wage flexibility will be higher in states
with a larger fraction of the unemployed on temporary layoff. In addi
tion, we expect greater flexibility m right-to-work states and in states
where minimum wages are less important.
Our study of wage inflation and unemployment in the 10 economic
regions of Great Britain (Hyclak and Johnes 1992) lends some support to
a couple of these hypotheses. We found that an index of wage flexibility
was negatively correlated with the proportion of working days lost
through work stoppages and with the percent of the labor force out of
work for over a year across the 10 regions. However, the small sample of
regions in that study limited the analysis to an examination of
correlations.
One result from our study of the British regions that could not be
replicated in initial runs in this study concerns the effect of labor market
mismatch. A mismatch between the skills required for vacancies and
those possessed by the unemployed might reduce wage flexibility in a
manner analogous to that hypothesized for the long-term unemployed.
In our study of the regions m Great Britain, we found evidence of a
negative correlation between wage flexibility and Layard and Nickell's
(1986) measure of mismatch resulting from changes in industrial struc
ture. However, neither that variable nor a measure of occupational
mismatch developed by Jackman, Layard and Savouri (1990) were ever
statistically significant in regressions for the states. This may be due to
greater mobility in the United States, to greater variation in the relative
performance of various regions in the United States over time, or to the
difficulties of measuring mismatch. Since it is difficult to disentangle
labor market mismatch from the insider-outsider effects, we have ex
cluded the mismatch variables from the regression results reported
below.
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In this section we define the variables used in the cross-section
regression analysis of interstate differences in the responsiveness of
wage inflation to unemployment. The dependent variable in these re
gressions is the negative of the unemployment coefficient in the Phillips
curve regressions reported in table 2.1. This measure of wage respon
siveness to labor market slack is highly correlated with all of the other
Phillips curve unemployment coefficients discussed in chapter 2 and in
the appendix. For convenience we name the dependent variable
WFLEX for the rest of this chapter.
One measure of interstate differences in the extent to which firms
utilize efficiency wages is based on the interindustry estimates of Krueger
and Summers (1988). They examined the industry wage structure and
estimated the proportionate difference in wages between an employee in
a given industry and the average employee, controlling for human
capital variables, occupation, and union status. The effects of industry
affiliation on relative wages in their study is quite pronounced—chang
ing industry had about the same impact as changing union status—and
remarkably stable across space and time (see also Krueger and Sum
mers 1987). They carefully eliminated a number of competing explana
tions for these industry wage effects and concluded that they represented
differences in the use of efficiency wages. Since they found their esti
mates to be stable across geographic regions, we use the Krueger and
Summers estimates to construct a measure of the efficiency wage indus
try mix (EWMIX) for each state in 1974. The efficiency wage industry
mix is defined as the weighted average across 6 one-digit nonmanufacturing industries and 20 two-digit manufacturing industries of the na
tional industry wage effects, using the proportion of state employment
in each industry as weights. To the extent that this variable captures
interstate differences in efficiency wage use, we expect the efficiency
wage industry mix to be negatively related to wage flexibility.
A second variable related to the efficiency wage hypothesis is the
proportion of establishments in each state with 20 or fewer employees

66 Wage Flexibility and Unemployment

(SMALL). Small establishments are less likely to employ efficiency
wage systems because it is easier to monitor the work effort of indi
viduals in small firms and because small firms generally are less able to
afford to pay wages above the market level (Groshen 1988 and Brown
1990). Ehrenberg and Smith (1991) suggest also that the significantly
higher turnover registered by small firms means that at any given time a
relatively large proportion of these firms are new entrants with no
established wage structure who are better able to scale wages to market
levels. Thus we expect SMALL to be positively related to wage flexibil
ity. Data on the fraction of establishments with 20 or fewer workers are
from the 1977 County Business Patterns.
The data published by the Department of Labor in the annual Geo
graphic Profile ofEmployment and Unemployment allow us to construct
variables measuring state differences in the importance of long-term
unemployment and temporary layoffs. Since any definition of "long
term" is inherently arbitrary, we employ two measures of long-term
unemployment. LTU26 is the percentage of the unemployed who were
out of work for more than 26 weeks in a given year. Data are available on
LTU26 for the 11 years from 1976 to 1986. In order to control for
cyclical effects, LTU26 for each state is calculated as the mean value
over that time span. We also use a measure of the fraction of the
unemployed out of work for more than 52 weeks (LTU52). Data for this
variable are available only for the six years from 1976 to 1981 and again
LTU52 for each state is calculated as the mean over that period. Data are
also available on the percentage of the unemployed who were on layoff in
each state for 1976 and 1981 to 1986. The variable LAYOFF is the
average of that fraction for each state for the available years. The
discussion in the previous section suggests that long-term unemploy
ment should be negatively related to wage flexibility while layoff unem
ployment is expected to have a positive effect on wage flexibility.
To measure the extent of union coverage (UNION) we use the esti
mates of the percentage of employees who were union members in each
state by Troy and Sheflin (1985). They report union density figures for
each state for the years 1960, 1975, 1980 and 1982. UNION is calcu
lated as the mean value for each state for these four years. Troy and
Sheflin were also the source for information on states with right-to-work
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laws (RTW). UNION should have a negative effect and RTW a positive
effect on wage flexibility. The relative minimum wage was calculated for
each state by dividing the statutory minimum wage by the average
hourly wage in manufacturing for the years 1964 to 1986. RELMIN is
defined as the mean relative minimum wage for each state over that span
of years. The minimum wage is likely to have a stronger impact on states
with high values for RELMIN and, hence, we expect this variable to be
negatively related to WFLEX.
Table 3.1 provides the means, standard deviations, and ranges for
each of the variables used in our analysis of the determinants of wage
flexibility across the 48 states in the sample. The mean value for our
efficiency wage—industrial mix variable is negative because of the
relatively large weight given to retail, wholesale, and services employ
ment in most states and the negative industry wage effects for these
industries in Krueger and Summers (1988). States at the low end of the
range for EWMIX are Maine, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota
and Rhode Island, while Iowa, Michigan, West Virginia, and Delaware
join Wyoming at the high end. There does not appear to be any clear
regional pattern to the values of EWMIX. The data for the fraction of
establishments accounted for by small firms runs in a fairly narrow
range across the states. The lowest values are for older, industrial states
like Ohio, Massachusetts, Maryland, and Illinois while the highest
values are seen in more rural states like Maine, Montana, and North and
South Dakota. A similar pattern holds with the relative minimum wage.
In this case, Washington and Oregon join the industrial states of Michi
gan and Ohio at the low end of the range. North and South Carolina,
Mississippi, and Arkansas register the highest values for RELMIN.
Layoffs and long-term unemployment seem more prominent in the
industrial northeast and less so in the mountain states. The cross-state
pattern of UNION and RTW is quite familiar, with greater unionization
in the industrial states.

Single Equation Estimates
Table 3.2 presents the results of several regressions of WFLEX on the
independent variables across the sample of 48 states. Since the depen-
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Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics on Variables
Used in the Cross-Section Analysis
Variable

Mean

Standard Deviation

Low

High

WFLEX
EWMIX
SMALL
UNION
RTW
RELMIN
LAYOFF
LTU26
LTU52

.7766
-.0092
8872
2250
.4166
4540
.1552
.1356
.0468

.5601
.0123
.0133
0868
4982
.0655
.0541
.0383
.0196

-.1212(NM)
-.0328(NV)
.8604(IL)
0613(SC)
0
.3374(MI)
.0634(NM)
0695(WY)
.0115(WY)

2.9000(ND)
.0248(WY)
.9209(MT)
4166(MI)
1.0
.5922(NC)
2756(PA)
.2250(WV)
. 1025(NY)

dent variable in these regressions is itself a regression coefficient, the
variance of WFLEX differs substantially from state to state and is likely
to be proportional to the residual variance in an ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression. Thus we report both ordinary least squares and
generalized least squares (GLS) estimates. In the GLS regressions, the
inverse of the variance of WFLEX from the time series results is used to
weight the observations for each state (see Granger et al. 1979 and Kaun
and Spiro 1970). And the OLS results report the heteroskedasticity—
consistent standard errors from the method of White (1980). In general,
the results are very good. The regressions explain a fairly high propor
tion of the state-to-state variation in wage flexibility and the tests for
specification error and normality are acceptable. The independent vari
ables are generally statistically significant, with the expected signs
indicating considerable support for the hypotheses derived from the
efficiency wage and insider-outsider theories of wage rigidity.
The efficiency wage industry mix variable has a statistically signifi
cant negative relationship with WFLEX in all four regressions reported
in table 3.1. The indication is that states with fewer employees in
industries employing efficiency wage schemes, as measured by Krueger
and Summers (1988), also have greater wage flexibility. The efficiency
wage link to wage rigidity is also supported by the statistically signifi-
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Determinants of Interstate Differences in Wage Flexibility

OLS

OLS

GLS

GLS

-7.23
(4.46)

-3.34
(4.48)

-8 14
(504)

-8 88
(5 16)

EWMIX

-24.28
(6.95)
[-.53]

-23.84
(6.83)
[-.52]

-3906
(4.84)
[-.86]

-38.90
(4.97)
[-.86]

SMALL

12.88
(4.88)
[.30]

8.04
(514)
[-19]

14.01
(5.15)
[-33]

1482
(5.36)
[-35]

UNION

-4.26
(1.78)
[-.66]

-2.96
(1.57)
[-.46]

-5.75
(2.00)
[-.89]

-6.14
(1.90)
[-•95]

0.53
(0.17)
[.47]

0.50
(0.17)
[44]

0.64
(0.17)
[.56]

0.64
(0.18)
[.56]

RELMIN

-7.80
(1.84)
[-91]

-668
(1.80)
[-.78]

-8.04
(2.30)
[-.94]

-8.20
(2.31)
[-.96]

LAYOFF

2 85
(1 12)
[27]

358
(104)
[35]

7.21
(1.87)
[.70]

699
(188)
[.68]

LTU26

1 40
(196)
[-09]

CONSTANT

RTW

LTU52

R2

-2.26
(3.40)
[-.15]
-6.32
(3.17)
[-.22]

-1 78
(602)
[-•06]

50

.52

89

.89

RESET

0.85

1.30

2.21

2.51

JARQUE-BERA

1 34

2.62

0.93

1.16

Parentheses contain standard errors For the OLS regressions we report the heteroskedasticityconsistent standard errors of White (1980) Beta coefficients are reported in brackets GLS
estimates weight each observation by the inverse of the estimated variance of WFLEX
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cant positive coefficients on SMALL, indicating greater wage flexibility
in states with a higher proportion of employment in firms with fewer
than 20 employees. To the extent that small firms do not face the same
monitoring costs that make efficient wage mechanisms profitable, this
result is also consistent with the hypothesis that the use of efficiency
wages affects overall wage flexibility.
It is possible to interpret the results for these two variables as consis
tent with implicit contract theory. Such theory is likely to apply more
readily to employment situations involving long-term attachments and
specific training. Such situations are likely to vary across firms and
industries and EWMIX and SMALL may be capturing such effects.
And the size effect may reflect heterogeneity in skills, capital intensity,
and technology across firms as well as greater product market competi
tion among small firms in addition to contract and efficiency wages
effects. These results provide only an indirect test of the efficiency wage
hypothesis and might more generously be interpreted as evidence for
other theories which explain stable interindustry wage differentials,
despite Krueger and Summers' (1988) valiant effort to rule out alter
native explanations for their measures.
The union density variable has a statistically significant negative
coefficient in all four regressions reported in table 3.1. This is consistent
with the earlier finding of Kaun and Spiro (1970) and with the hypoth
esis that collective bargaining agreements contribute to overall wage
rigidity. The importance of the labor relations climate in explaining
state-by-state differences in wage flexibility is evidenced by the signifi
cant positive coefficients estimated for RTW. The results also indicate
that wage flexibility is significantly lower in states where the minimum
wage is relatively more important.
Mixed results are registered for the two variables suggested by the
insider-outsider theory of wage determination. The estimated coeffi
cient on LAYOFF is highly significant and positive, indicating greater
wage flexibility in states where a higher fraction of the unemployed were
on temporary layoff in the mid-1970s and early 1980s. This is consistent
with the notion that the responsiveness of wages to overall unemploy
ment levels is sensitive to the composition of unemployment by cause,
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which can be explained by unions taking into account the threat of job
loss to current employees in setting wage demands but, as is suggested
by the insider-outsider theory, not responding as readily to search
unemployment by job quitters or labor force entrants. This result for
LAYOFF is also what might be expected from a reading of the literature
on the appearance of substantial union wage concessions in the 1980s
(Wachter and Carter 1989). On the other hand, long-term unemploy
ment generally is not a statistically significant determinant of wage
flexibility, except in the case of LTU52 in the second OLS regression.
This is in contrast to a number of European studies and our own results
in analysing wage flexibility across the 10 economic regions of Great
Britain. It may be that the combination of more vigorous job creation
and less generous unemployment compensation makes long-term un
employment less serious in the United States than in Europe. In addi
tion, this result might reflect the relatively low variation in long-term
unemployment across the 48 states.
Beta coefficients, shown in brackets in table 3.2, can be used to
measure the relative strength of the independent variables in affecting
the dependent variable. No single independent variable is revealed as a
dominant determinant of wage flexibility across the states. Unioniza
tion, the relative minimum wage, and the efficiency wage industry mix
have the strongest effects in both the OLS and GLS regressions. The
average fraction of the unemployed on layoff has a much higher beta
coefficient in the GLS regressions. The right-to-work law dummy has
consistent effects across the regressions that are only slightly weaker
than those for the other variables. The fraction of establishments with 20
or fewer workers and long-term unemployment seem to have relatively
small effects on wage flexibility, by this measure.
Concentrating on the GLS estimates, we see that a one standard
deviation increase in EWMIX, UNION and RELMIN is associated with
close to a one standard deviation decrease in our wage flexibility mea
sure. The strong effect noted for the relative minimum wage variable
reflects largely the impact of regional wage structure on flexibility, since
the source of cross-state variation in RELMIN is the average manufac
turing wage. A one standard deviation increase in LAYOFF and RTW is
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associated with a .70 and .56 standard deviation rise in flexibility.
Clearly, these variables are also important determinants of cross-state
differences in wage flexibility.
Wage flexibility is highest in the West North Central region and in
North and South Dakota, in particular. These states have relatively low
unionization rates, right-to-work laws, a high proportion of small firms
and relatively low efficiency wage industry mixes. The opposite de
scription on these four measures characterizes the industrial states in the
East North Central, Middle Atlantic and New England states where
wage flexibility is relatively low. Differences in LAYOFF between these
areas are also quite pronounced.
Wage flexibility is surprisingly low for a number of southern states
where unionization is not important and right-to-work laws exist. This is
especially the case for Georgia, Alabama, Tennessee, and Mississippi.
Here the relative minimum wage is especially important since RELMIN
for all four states is above average and Mississippi registers the second
highest value for the variable. Alabama and Tennessee also have union
ization rates that are high for the south and about average values for
EWMIX.
The relative minimum wage variable is also an important factor in
explaining the case of New Mexico, which has very low wage flexibility
in a region of high flexibility states. RELMIN for New Mexico is about
one standard deviation above the mean for all states while the values for
its neighbors, Texas, Arizona, Utah and Colorado, are at or slightly
below the mean. In addition, New Mexico and Colorado are the two
states in that group without a right-to-work law and New Mexico
registers the lowest value for LAYOFF among the states. Low values of
RELMIN help account for high wage flexibility in the Pacific North
west. The value for RELMIN is more than one standard deviation below
the mean for both Oregon and Washington, which has the second lowest
value for this variable.

Two-Stage Estimates
It would appear easy to question the exogeneity of long-term unem
ployment and layoffs in the wage flexibility regressions reported above.
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The link between wage flexibility and employment variability that is at the
heart of much of recent macroeconomic theory would seem to argue that
states with greater wage flexibility are likely to have fewer layoffs. And if
wage rigidity causes fewer job vacancies in any given state of the econ
omy, then there might be a negative relationship between wage flexibility
and long-term unemployment. This section investigates this issue by
specifying equations explaining both LTU and LAYOFF as a function of
WFLEX and other variables and by estimating these regressions along
with our model of the determinants of WFLEX by two-stage techniques.
While a detailed study of the determinants of long-term unemploy
ment and layoff unemployment is beyond the scope of this chapter, we
have identified a number of structural features of the state economy that
are likely to be related to these variables (see Wunnava and Henley
1987). The exogenous control variables in the equation explaining
LTU52 are: UNION; the average annual percentage change in real
Gross State Product (GSP) from 1976 to 1986 (PCGSP); the average
unemployment insurance replacement rate multiplied by the average
fraction of the workforce insured over the 1964-1982 period (UI); and
the average fraction of employment service applicants placed into jobs
over the 1975-1980 period (ESPL). The exogenous variables in the
equation explaining interstate differences in LAYOFF are: UNION, UI,
the percentage of workers employed in manufacturing in 1973 (MFG),
and the variance of the annual rate of real GSP growth over the 19761986 period. In addition to the exogenous variables in each equation, the
list of instruments included dummy variables for three of the four major
census regions of the country.
The two-stage generalized least squares (2SLS) estimates, weighting
each variable as in the GLS regressions in table 3.2, are reported as
equation (3.1) below. Standard errors are written in parentheses.
WFLEX=-5.68-42.40 EWMIX +10.58 SMALL-5.37 UNION
(6.25) (5.62)
(6.70)
(2.10)
+ .57 RTW-7.32 RELMIN + 10.51 LAYOFF
(.20)
(2.54)
(2.58)
-13.82LTU52R2 = .88
(9.87)

(3.1)
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The two-stage estimates are similar to the GLS results reported in the
previous section. The main effect of treating WFLEX, LAYOFF, and
LTU52 as jointly endogenous variables is to raise substantially the
coefficient estimate and significance level for LAYOFF and reduce
slightly the estimated coefficients on SMALL, UNION, RTW, and
RELMIN. Although the point estimate of the effect of LTU52 on
WFLEX is increased here, so is the standard error of this variable. In
general, the conclusions of the preceding section are not altered by the
two-stage results.
The 2SLS coefficients for the long-term unemployment equation are
(standard errors in parentheses):
LTU52 = .052-.012 WFLEX+ .074 UNION-.001 PCGSP
(.018)
(.030)
(.017) (.006)
+ .084 UI-.008 ESPL R2 = .42
(.004)
(.056)

(3.2)

Wage flexibility has a statistically significant negative effect on longterm unemployment across the 48 states in this sample. This is consis
tent with the notion that wage flexibility enhances the efficiency of the
search process in labor markets. Long-term unemployment is signifi
cantly higher in the most heavily unionized states, suggesting perhaps
that workers prefer to queue for union jobs and accept a long duration of
unemployment as the cost of doing so (Abowd and Farber 1982). Longterm unemployment is negatively related to the average annual rate of
growth of real Gross State Product, although this coefficient estimate is
substantially less than its standard error. All of the above-mentioned
effects appear reasonable and the overall regression appears sound.
Regression (3.2) has some interesting results related to interstate
differences in the unemployment insurance and employment service
systems. The combined effect of more generous replacement rates and
higher coverage acts to increase long-term unemployment, other things
equal. This effect, however, is only marginally significant in the statis
tical sense. Greater public employment service effectiveness, as mea
sured by the average placement rate, has a statistically significant
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negative relationship with long-term unemployment. Government ac
tion to improve the job search process through the activities of the public
employment service can, thus, have an indirect effect on wage flexibility
by reducing the fraction of the unemployed with long durations of
unemployment.
Finally, the layoff unemployment regression results are:
LAYOFF = - .028 + .004 WFLEX + .003 MFC + .464 UI
(.031) (.014)
(.0007)
(.151)
+. 127 UNION + .008 VAR(PCGSP) R2 = .50 (3.3)
(.074)
(.006)
Wage flexibility is found to have no relationship to the fraction of the
unemployed on layoff. Union density has a positive and statistically
significant effect in this equation as in that explaining LTU52. In addi
tion to the direct effect of unionization on wage flexibility in equation
(3.1), there are also important indirect effects of this variable in increas
ing both the duration of unemployment and the importance of layoffs as
a cause of unemployment. The unemployment insurance variable has a
positive effect on LAYOFF that is significant at the .05 level, suggesting
that firms are more willing to use layoffs in states with more generous
unemployment compensation systems. Like UNION, the unemploy
ment insurance replacement rate appears to have a significant indirect
effect on wage flexibility through its relationship with LTU52 and
LAYOFF Although we must interpret these coefficient estimates with
caution, they do indicate that the unemployment insurance replacement
rate may have a net positive effect on wage flexibility since the UI
coefficient in the LAYOFF equation is about five times larger than that in
the long-term unemployment regression and since LAYOFF is
positively related to WFLEX. Finally, states with a more pronounced
business cycle, as measured by the variance of annual real GSP growth
rates and by the relative importance of manufacturing in the state
economy, are also more likely to experience a greater degree of layoff
unemployment.
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Summary

The most widely accepted theoretical explanations for differences in
aggregate wage flexibility across labor markets focus on factors that
would cause firms within those labor markets to pay wages above the
market-clearing rate and wages that are isolated from local unemploy
ment. Differences between aggregate labor markets are then traced to
differences in the proportions of firms in each area following nonmarket
wage policies. One reason why firms may find it rational to pursue such
wage policies is that they incorporate forecasts of appropriate wages into
long-term contracts that cover periods which may have unemployment
or inflation surprises. Or the firm may find that worker effort or
efficiency is positively linked to the wage level making unjustified wage
reductions counterproductive. Finally, wage setting in some firms may
be closely linked to the bargaining power of insider workers who have
little incentive to be responsive to the effect of their wage policy on the
job prospects of unemployed workers who are outsiders to the firm.
This chapter attempted empirically to examine the ability of these
wage rigidity theories to explain interstate differences in the responsiveness of wage inflation to unemployment. The results demonstrate
considerable support for the efficiency wage and insider-outsider theo
ries and for the hypothesis that union wage setting is a prominent factor
leading to wage rigidity. We are able to draw four main conclusions
about the determinants of interstate differences in wage flexibility:
(1) Wage flexibility is higher in states with a larger fraction of small
enterprises and with an industry mix tilted away from those industries
that Krueger and Summers (1988) identify as employing efficiency
wage mechanisms Both of these results provide at least an indirect
test of the hypothesis that efficiency wages lead to wage rigidity. Our
findings cannot reject that hypothesis.
(2) Wage flexibility is higher in states with relatively low rates of union
membership and in states that have passed nght-to-work laws Both
of these results are consistent with models tracing wage rigidity to the
effects of collective bargaining contracts on the labor market.
(3) Wage flexibility is higher in states with a larger fraction of the
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unemployed on layoff and in states with a smaller fraction of the
unemployed with long durations of joblessness. These results are
consistent with two insights from the insider-outsider model of wage
determination: that insiders moderate wage demands when faced
with the threat of insider job losses and that insiders do not consider
the unemployment of outsiders in setting wages.
(4) Wage flexibility is higher in states where the statutory minimum wage
relative to the average manufacturing wage is lower. It appears that
minimum wages affect wage rigidity by limiting the extent to which
average wages can be adjusted in a downward direction.

The basic results were found to hold for the most part even when longterm and layoff unemployment were treated as jointly endogenous
variables with WFLEX. The two-stage results uncovered a strong,
simultaneous relationship between wage flexibility and the fraction of
the unemployed out of work for more than a year. Long-term unemploy
ment was found to have a strong negative effect on wage flexibility, and
wage flexibility was negatively related to long-term unemployment
across the 48 states While the two-stage results suggested a stronger
effect of layoff unemployment on wage flexibility than did the OLS
estimates, there was no evidence that wage flexibility was a significant
determinant of interstate differences in layoffs as a cause of
unemployment.
The two-stage results also suggested important indirect effects of
union density, unemployment insurance benefits, and public employ
ment service effectiveness on wage flexibility. Union density is seen as
affecting wage flexibility differences across the 48 states indirectly by
increasing both long-term and layoff unemployment. The variable mea
suring the combined effects of the unemployment insurance replace
ment and worker coverage rates was also positively related to both longterm unemployment and layoff unemployment. And the effectiveness of
the public employment service, as measured by the average fraction of
applicants placed in jobs, had a statistically significant negative rela
tionship with long-term unemployment. Neither of these variables had a
statistically significant effect when added directly to the wage flexibility
regressions.

4
Conclusion
The purpose of this project has been to attempt to provide additional
empirical information about the dynamics of regional labor markets that
could also provide some insight into the important theoretical problem
of wage rigidity. In doing so, we feel we have made two important
contributions. First, we have specified a relatively simple labor market
model that treats wage inflation and unemployment as jointly endoge
nous variables and that fits the data well for most of the states and
metropolitan areas studied over the 1964-1986 period. Our second
contribution has been a successful effort to test, at least indirectly,
hypotheses about the determinants of wage rigidity contained m recent
theoretical contributions. This summary of our findings first reviews the
empirical results regarding wage inflation, unemployment and the de
terminants of wage rigidity before turning to a brief discussion of the
policy implications of our study.

Regional Wage Inflation
Our analysis of wage inflation starts with a rudimentary Phillips curve
model that treats regional wage inflation as a function of regional
unemployment and national price inflation lagged one year. Despite its
simplicity, the model does quite well in fitting the time series data for
most of the states. Regressions of actual wage inflation on the rate of
wage inflation forecast by the model for the 1964-86 period yield R2
statistics greater than .65 for 33 of the 48 states. In addition, the
coefficient estimates are generally statistically significant and of reason
able magnitudes.
One issue that has received some attention in the past concerns
79
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whether or not wage inflation is transmitted from leading to lagging
regions. Tests for spatial auto-correlation in our samples do not provide
support for the existence of a regional inflation transmission hierarchy.
Thus our approach of estimating the labor market model separately for
each area appears justified, at least when, as here, annual data are used.
Of primary concern in the time series analysis is the estimated
coefficient on the local unemployment rate in the Phillips curve regres
sions. This estimate of the slope of the Phillips relationship is our index
of wage flexibility. We find that wage flexibility is lowest in the New
England and Middle Atlantic states. In fact, the unemployment coeffi
cients in the Phillips curve regressions for Maine, New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and Delaware are
not statistically different from zero using conventional significance
levels. The only other state for which we reach the same conclusion is
New Mexico. Estimated wage flexibility is highest for states west of the
Mississippi, particularly for the Plains states, and for a few states in the
Southeast. Our conclusion that wage flexibility varies systematically
across the states is reinforced by our finding of regional clusters of states
with similar flexibility estimates. It is reassuring to note that states with
similar industry and population mixes, such as South and North Dakota
or Ohio and Michigan, also have similar wage flexibility coefficients.
A number of recent empirical studies of wage inflation and unemploy
ment in Europe have concluded that hysteresis in the process generating
the equilibrium unemployment rate lowers the responsiveness of wages
to the level of unemployment. We test for hysteresis in the state results
by including lagged unemployment rates m the Phillips curves and
examining the estimated effects of the level of unemployment and
changes in unemployment on wage inflation. In general, our findings do
not support the hysteresis hypothesis, although there is evidence of
partial hysteresis in a number of states and hysteresis might explain the
very slight response of wages to unemployment in some of the north
eastern states.

Regional Unemployment
Our two-equation labor market model derives the unemployment
equation, our Fisher curve, from an Okun's law relationship and a
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markup pricing equation. While the model treats unemployment as
determined solely by demand forces and assumes constant the role of
labor supply factors as explicit unemployment rate determinants, it
nevertheless does an excellent job of fitting the time series on state
unemployment rates. Regressions of actual unemployment on that fore
cast by our model for each state over the 1964-1986 time period
generate R2 statistics that are quite high in almost every case. In
addition, the forecasts of unemployment rates over time for each state
are also accurate in predicting the cross-state pattern of unemployment
rates. The correlation coefficient across the 48 states between actual
unemployment and that forecast by the time series model for each state
was .939 for 1965 and .942 for 1985.
The success of the model in explaining unemployment changes over
time as a response to demand influences contrasts with the results of
Marston (1985) and Roback (1982), among others. These cross-section
analyses of equilibrium unemployment rates in regional labor markets
conclude that migration appears to offset quickly local demand shocks to
employment and unemployment rates. However, studies by Topel
(1986), Bartik (1991) and Holzer (1991) suggest that local demand
shocks have fairly long-lasting effects on wages and unemployment,
which seems to square with the results of the model. Still, a fruitful area
of extension for our labor market model would be to incorporate labor
force participation and net migration into the determination of unem
ployment rates.
The primary result from the labor market model is a fresh way of
looking at two long-standing issues in labor economics. First, it allows
us to view the scatter diagram of wage inflation and unemployment rates
as the interaction of supply changes, through the Phillips curve, and
demand changes, via the Fisher curve, rather than as evidence for or
against the stability of the Phillips relationship. Second, it provides a
new way of incorporating wage influences as a determinant of unem
ployment that contrasts in its statistical success with the attempts to
discern the effect of real wage levels on cyclical movements in U.S.
employment and unemployment.
We concentrate most of our attention on the results of applying the
model to state data. Clearly, metropolitan areas are conceptually closer
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to our idea of a local labor market. However, problems of data availabil
ity and periodic changes in the boundaries of Metropolitan Statistical
Areas (MSAs) limit the number of areas for which reasonably lengthy
time series can be constructed. The results for 16 MSAs yield essentially
the same conclusions about the geographic pattern of wage inflation and
unemployment as do our results on state data.

Wage Flexibility
The substantial variation across the 48 states in our estimates of the
responsiveness of wage inflation to unemployment allows us to test
several hypotheses regarding the determinants of wage flexibility (or
wage rigidity). While a few previous studies have generated evidence
that wages are less responsive to unemployment in more unionized areas
or industries, our examination extends to a test of hypotheses derived
from the recently developed work in efficiency wage and insideroutsider bargaining theories. While our cross-section regressions test
these hypotheses indirectly, they lead us to conclude that wages are less
flexible in regional labor markets in which firms are more likely to use
efficiency wage mechanisms, workers are more heavily unionized, and
the structure of unemployment affects wage bargains in a manner
consistent with the insider-outsider model.
We also find four ways in which policy measures seem to affect the
responsiveness of wages to unemployment. Other things equal, wage
flexibility was higher in the 19 states with right-to-work laws and in
states with low relative minimum wages. We also found evidence of an
indirect effect of the unemployment insurance replacement rate on wage
flexibility operating through the effects of benefits on long-term unem
ployment and the relative importance of layoffs as a cause of unemploy
ment. It is interesting that the net direction of this indirect effect of
unemployment compensation on wage flexibility appears to be positive.
This is because benefits increase the likelihood of layoffs as well as the
duration of unemployment, and a high incidence of layoff unemploy
ment is found to increase wage flexibility. Finally, the effectiveness of the
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public employment service, as measured by the average placement rate
of applicants, also had an indirect effect on wage flexibility operating
through the effects of the employment service placement rate on longterm unemployment. However, all of the results reported in chapter 3
should be regarded as preliminary and worthy of further investigation.

Policy Considerations
There are both macroeconomic and microeconomic policy issues
related to this research.
On the macroeconomic side, our results are very much in line with the
main policy conclusion of New-Keynesian economics (Gordon 1990a,
p. 1163): ".. .the optimal objective of stabilization policy should be to
stabilize the growth rate of nominal GNP." However, in addition to the
numerous obstacles to achieving that objective through national eco
nomic policy, our research highlights the potential importance of re
gional factors in attempting to stabilize the growth of nominal Gross
State Product (GSP) across many subnational jurisdictions.
While some variation in demand growth across the states is necessary
to accommodate efficient geographic reallocations of resources and
production, there may be a role for state-level fiscal policy or national
regional policy to stabilize the growth rate of nominal GSP, relative to
the growth of national aggregate demand. Simulations for 1982 and
1986 indicate that equalizing demand growth across the states would
have had significant effects on the unemployment rates of individual
states, but surprisingly little impact on the national average unemploy
ment rate. Whether this finding reflects an unusual divergence in re
gional demand growth during the 1980s or is a more general phe
nomenon deserves further investigation.
While the effect of equalizing state demand growth on inflation really
cannot be addressed by our model, we can speculate on one possible
inflation effect. Our simulations show that the northeastern states would
have had slower growth and higher unemployment in the economic
recovery from 1982 to 1986 if local demand had grown at the national
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rate. Slower growth probably would have meant less real estate inflation
and might have resulted in fewer real estate-related problems in the
construction and banking industries in those states. An extension of our
model to include housing market and product price effects appears
highly warranted where the availability of data permits.
While it is possible to use the model to simulate the effects of
stabilizing regional demand growth relative to national Gross National
Product (GNP) growth, it is far more difficult to prescribe how this
might come about in practice. Clearly, federal or state fiscal policy
would have to be used for this target. However, there does not appear to
be much political support for such policies at either level. The fact that a
number of states facing budget problems in the 1991 recession were
forced to consider spending cuts and tax increases, suggests that state
fiscal policy may be destabilizing demand growth in certain regions.
Still, further research into the potential for appropriately structured
state fiscal policies to implement national efforts to stabilize GNP
growth appears warranted (Bahl 1984).
The microeconomic policy considerations essentially involve two
questions. Should the state or federal governments explicitly adopt
increased wage flexibility as a policy objective? If so, how could govern
ment policy increase wage flexibility in regional labor markets?
The question of the desirability of wage flexibility receives no clearcut answer from economic theory (Hahn and Solow 1986). Our results,
however, suggest that there may be some beneficial effects from wage
flexibility. Across the 48 states, wage flexibility is correlated with lower
average wage inflation rates, albeit more variable wage inflation rates,
over the business cycle. Wage flexibility is also correlated with lower
average unemployment rates and less variation in joblessness over the
cycle. And wage flexibility is correlated with a smaller incidence of
long-duration joblessness across the states. Admittedly, these findings
are by-products of our main line of inquiry in this study and the
statistical evidence is not overwhelming. Still, there is some empirical
evidence to suggest that unemployment problems may be less severe in
areas with greater wage flexibility.
How to achieve wage flexibility also involves difficult questions, since
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our results suggest that wage flexibility reflects mainly the industry, size,
and union mix of firms in the regional economy. The policy variables
included in the analysis of the determinants of wage flexibility—whether
or not the state has a right-to-work law and the relative minimum wage—
are also structural variables that do not appear to lend themselves easily
to marginal changes to accomplish a movement toward greater wage
flexibility. This is especially true for right-to-work laws, since many
observers regard the existence of such legislation to be a reflection of the
citizens' pre-existing preferences regarding unions (Hirsch and Addison
1986). And a state's ranking with regard to the relative minimum wage
depends more on its wage structure than on the statutory wage set by the
federal government.
There are some state policies that might enhance regional wage
flexibility as a side effect. To the extent that experiments to improve job
search and retraining for displaced workers (Leigh 1989) succeed in
lowering long-term unemployment, as is suggested by our result that a
higher placement rate in the employment service lowers long-duration
joblessness, this might have the added effect of increasing wage flexibil
ity. Similarly, wage flexibility might be enhanced by a shift in economic
development policy from traditional "smokestack chasing" to policies
designed to encourage local entrepreneurship and small business devel
opment (Carroll, Hyde, and Hudson 1987). Indeed, our results could be
taken to suggest that wage rigidity is a potential cost that must be
weighed against the employment and tax benefits to be derived from
traditional development policies designed to attract firms that are likely
to use efficiency wage mechanisms.
Even in the absence of policies designed to increase wage flexibility, it
is likely that wage flexibility will increase in the American economy in
the near future. The ongoing transformation in the industrial, demo
graphic and geographic composition of economic activity should, ac
cording to the analysis in chapter 3, result in more flexible wages. As
these changes continue, the economy will, in a sense, provide an
experiment to determine if greater wage flexibility does indeed improve
labor market performance. An extension of this research to an examina
tion of structural shifts in wage responsiveness would appear to be a
worthwhile endeavor.

Appendix
Here we consider a number of issues related to the time series estimates
of our labor market model reported in chapter 2. Since the main focus in
that chapter is the measurement of the degree of wage flexibility in
regional labor markets, it is necessary to consider whether those esti
mates are robust to changes in the method of estimation or the specifica
tion of variables. In general, we find that all of our estimates of a l are
highly correlated across the states, indicating that those results are
indeed robust and that we can consider the cross-section analysis in
chapter 3 with a greater degree of confidence.

Differences in Estimation Method
In chapter 2 we reported coefficient estimates derived by the method
of three-stage least squares (3SLS). The advantage of using 3SLS is that
it is a full information method that generally has a smaller asymptotic
variance-covanance matrix than single-equation estimators. The prob
lem with 3SLS is that any misspecification in the system affects all the
parameter estimates.
Hausman (1978) tests can be used to examine the exogeneity of
regressors and thus to determine whether it is necessary to use more
sophisticated estimators. The Hausman tests essentially examine
whether or not the coefficients from alternative estimators are equal,
taking into account differences in the variance-covariance matrices. In
comparing ordinary least squares (OLS) with 2SLS estimates, the
Hausman tests reject the null hypothesis of equality between the unem
ployment coefficients in the Phillips curves for 15 states at the 10 percent
significance level and 8 states at the 5 percent level. Tests on the wage
87
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inflation coefficient in the Fisher curve reject equal estimates for 29
states at the 10 percent level and for 22 states at the 5 percent signifi
cance level. These results suggest that OLS may be an appropriate
estimator for the Phillips curve except in a few cases, but question the
exogeneity of wage inflation in OLS estimates of the Fisher curve.
Hausman tests of the equality of coefficient estimates of the endogenous
variables using 2SLS and 3SLS reject the null hypothesis at the 10
percent level for 24 states and at the 5 percent level for 19 states.
Table A. 1 presents coefficient estimates using OLS, 2SLS and 3SLS
for a select sample of states. The states included are the largest in each of
the nine census regions. In the Phillips curve estimates, the main effect
of using 2SLS or 3SLS appears to be to raise the estimate of a, in some
cases. Across all 48 states, the a, estimates from the three methods are
highly correlated. The correlation between the OLS and 2SLS estimates
of a, across 48 states is .93 and that between the OLS and 3SLS
estimates is .92. The correlation between the 2SLS and 3SLS estimates
is .99. Clearly, our measure of regional differences in wage flexibility is
not much affected by the method of estimation
In the Fisher curve regressions reported in table A. 1, the coefficient
on wage inflation, /33 , is lower in the OLS regressions for all states,
especially for Colorado. The indication is that J33 may be biased toward
zero m the OLS regressions. As further evidence for this bias, the
unweighted mean of/33 across all 48 states is .2456 in OLS regressions,
.3540 in 2SLS regressions and .3674 in 3SLS regressions. There is also
a difference in the correlation across all 48 states between the OLS,
2SLS and 3SLS results. The correlation coefficient for the OLS and
2SLS estimates of /33 is .55 while the correlation coefficient between the
2SLS and 3SLS estimates of 03 is .92.
Our conclusion from this examination of alternative estimators is that
the method of estimation does not materially affect the calculated
responsiveness of wage inflation to unemployment. All of the estimates
of a, are highly correlated across the states. With regard to the Fisher
curve, it appears that OLS may generate biased estimates of the re
sponse of wage inflation to unemployment and that an explicit treatment
of the simultaneous relationship between the Phillips and Fisher curves
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Table A.I A Comparison of OLS, 2SLS and 3SLS
Coefficient Estimates, Selected States, 1964-1986
State
MA

NY

IL

MO

OLS
2SLS
3SLS
OLS
2SLS
3SLS
OLS
2SLS
3SLS
OLS
2SLS
3SLS

«o

«i

4.07*
4.20*
396*

-.10
- 14
-.12
- 19
-.22
-.09

.52*
.54*
.56*
.70*
.72*
67*

-.56*
- 59*
- 58*
-.46*
- 60*
-.59*
- 58*
- 91*
-.91*

3.64*
3 74*
3.17*
426*
4.38*
4.38*
4.22*
4.61*
455*

02

03

2.26*
1.93
1 52
1.00
53
.67

0i
.83*
.81*
.82*
.84*
80*
.77*

-.40*
-.41*
- 40*
-.22*
- 21*
-.22*

34*
.42*
.46*
.29*
38*
.42*

.99*
1 01*
1.01*
.84*
.90*
.90*

1.55*
1.11
.88
61
.45
.34

.95*
.96*
97*
95*
95*
95*

- 37*
- 38*
- 36*
-.26*
-.28*
- 26*

27*
.34*
34*
.31*
34*
.34*

98*
1 17*
1 17*
.84*
.88*
.89*

2.58*
2.30*
220*

.74*
.73*
.73*
88*
.88*
90*

-.27*
-.28*
- 28*
- 32*
- 34*
- 31*

34*
.43*
43*
.34*
.44*
.45*

1 18*
1 13*
1.14*
1 34
1 69
.77
201*
1.87*
1 89*

.87*
.88*
87*
.80*
.70*
.77*

-.26*
-.27*
- 27*
- 08
-.26*
- 16*

37*
40*
.40*

1.00*
1.01*
1.01*

-.39*
-.41*
-.41*

.30*
.34*
.34*

«2

FL

OLS
2SLS
3SLS

TN

OLS
2SLS
3SLS

429*
5.18*
5.16*
464*
4.85*
479*

TX

OLS
2SLS
3SLS
OLS
2SLS
3SLS

454*
5.69*
5.71*
4.54*
4.68*
4.59*

-.75*
-1.01*
-1.01*
-.84*
-.88*
-.85*

1 05*
1.09*
1.09*
1.00*
1.02*
1 00*

OLS
2SLS
3SLS

4.70*
5.72*
5.74*

-.62*
-.81*
-.82*

1.04*
1 11*
1.11*

CO

CA

*=Significant at 05 level

-.40*
-.47*
- 47*

00

1 67*
1 15
.66

09
.46*
.37*
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is called for. Given the Hausman tests discussed above and given that the
RESET statistics suggest few problems of specification error, we have
chosen to emphasize the 3SLS results in chapter 2.

The Effect of National Demand Growth
Our labor market model assumes that the growth of nominal Gross
State Product (GSP), our measure of regional demand growth, is ex
ogenous. Our justification for this is that the two primary determinants
of GSP growth are national monetary policy and the demand in the rest
of the world for exports from the rth region. In order to check the
sensitivity of our estimates to this exogeneity assumption, we have
reestimated the model for each state using the growth in nominal Gross
National Product (GNP) for the country as a whole as an instrument for
state GSP growth.
The results for a nine-state subsample are reported in tables A.2 and
A. 3. The Phillips curve estimates in table A. 2 are very little affected the correlation across all 48 states in the estimates of otj between the
3SLS estimates with state GSP growth and national GNP growth is .98.
So again, the estimate of primary concern for this study is immaterially
affected by this change in the specification of the model.
The coefficient estimates for the Fisher curve reported in table A.3 do
change considerably, as might be expected. There is no clear pattern of
change evident in the results in table A.3. However, across all 48 states
there is a tendency for higher parameter values in Fisher curves esti
mated with national demand growth. For example, the mean value of (32
across the 48 states is —.2634 using GSP growth and —.3509 in
regressions with GNP growth. Similarly, the mean estimate of /33 is
.3674 in the GSP growth regressions and .4099 in those with GNP
growth.
Since the estimates of wage responsiveness to unemployment are
unaffected by this change in the model and since we believe it is possible
to regard state GSP growth as exogenously determined, we have decided
to use our original specification in the main body of this book.
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Table A.2 Phillips Curve Estimates with National
Demand Growth, Selected States, 1964-1986
State

<*o

«,

«2

R2

d

RESET

JarqueBera

MA
NY
IL
MO
FL
TN
TX

4.18*
3.94*
443*
4.44*
558*
486*
5 84*
465*
6.32*

- 15
-.28
- 61*
- 57*
-1.02*
-.48*
-1 02*
- 87*
-.92*

56*
75*
1 02*
.90*
1 23*
89*
1 08*
1.01*
1.14*

.66
74
.79
.72
74
.70
88
.61
.92

1 37
1.31
204
1.82
1.13
1.82
1.87
1 58
1 38

2.40
2.78
.25
.89
3.53*
.41
.25
46
.44

5.15
.40
.55
11.66
1.54
2.28
.54
1.14
1.09

CO
CA

Estimated using 3SLS * = significant at 05 level R2 is that for an OLS regression of actual values
on those forecast by the model

Table A.3 Fisher Curve Estimates with National
Demand Growth, Selected States, 1964-1986

State
MA
NY
IL
MO
FL
TN
TX
CO
CA

00

Pi

02

03

R2

h

RESET

JarqueBera

-.43
.20
63
65
1.31
.60
1 42*
1 27
247*

.78*
.85*
1 02*
.89*
.89*
.90*
1.13*
.89*
.88*

- 18
-.22*
- 41*
-.34*
- 38*
- 47*
-.34*
-.26*
-.38*

.52*
46*
.49*
.47*
44*
.63*
.18*
.28*
30*

75
.87
95
90
.84
92
86
78
.82

1.07
2 14*
-1.08
-.67
- 54
-1.88
—
—
.21

08
21
60
20
04
2 84
.27
.47
09

3 36
2.20
1.08
1.15
3.93
1.04
.61
91
1.44

See footnotes to table A 2

92 Wage Flexibility and Unemployment
Statistical Problems

The array of tests in chapter 2 churned up a small number of potential
problems in the statistical analysis of a few states. The present section is
devoted to a consideration of those problems which appear when the
diagnostic tests are applied at the 1 percent significance level. Particular
attention will be paid to the question of whether or not the statistical
hiccoughs identified here bias the estimate of the unemployment coeffi
cient in the Phillips curve.
Attention in this section will first be concentrated upon just five states:
Missouri, Washington, Colorado, Idaho, and Wyoming. The Phillips
curve for Missouri in table 2.1 violates the assumption of normally
distributed residuals. The Phillips curve for Washington in table 2.1
violates the assumption of serially independent residuals. The Fisher
curve for Colorado in table 2.2 violates the same assumption. The
Fisher curves for Idaho and Wyoming, also reported in Table 2.2, are,
according to the RESET test, misspecified.
The problemsolving approach adopted in this section is as follows.
Where residuals are non-normally distributed, we identify any obvious
outliers and introduce a dichotomous variable into the relevant equation
for each of the outlying periods; each of these variables takes unit value
for the outlying period, and is zero in all other periods. Where residuals
are serially correlated, the 3SLS is repeated, using the Cochrane-Orcutt
transformations of the original variables. Finally, where the RESET
indicates the possible presence of misspecification, we introduce into
the right-hand side of an equation a quadratic term m the lagged
dependent variable. The results obtained by applying these methods are
reported in table A.4 (Phillips curves) and table A.5 (Fisher curves).
In the case of Missouri, examination of the Phillips curve regression
residuals indicates the presence of an outlying observation in 1977. In
that year, observed wage inflation was substantially higher than pre
dicted by the model. Including a 1977 dummy in the Phillips curve (and
as an instrumental variable) considerably improves the results obtained
for this state. The coefficient of greatest interest in the present study —
the unemployment coefficient in the Phillips curve—is virtually un-

Table A.4 Phillips Curve Estimates,
Corrected for Statistical Problems, 5 States, 1964-1986
W= cto + a i U+ a2p - i + «3D72+a4D73 + «5D77
as

R2

d

RESET

JarqueBera

4.5361
( 9065)

.867

205

.153

1.204

697

1 81

1 186

1 296

1.0843
(.1728)

.679

1 13

.373

.928

- 8698
( 3806)

.8112
(.2217)

.279

249

747

.990

- 3846
( 3206)

.9357 -9.1866 10.8802
(.1586) (2.0466) (2 1174)

.753

2.31

.078

236

State

CochraneOrcutt

MO

no

WA

yes

CO

yes

6 5150
(1.6545)

- 9496
(.3092)

ID

no

7.2922
(2.0515)

WY

no

2 5593
(1 9403)

«0

al

43420
(.5532)

- 5599
(.1272)

a2

ct3

ot4

.8763
(.0899)
3.7957 -1.2220
1.2078
(1.0116)
(.32251) (.1991)

Standard errors in parentheses The terms D72, D73 and D77 refer to dummy variables which each take zero value for all years but one, the exceptions are,
respectively, 1972, 1973 and 1977 In the case of the Cochrane-Orcutt 3SLS regressions, the time period covered is 1966-1986

Table A.5 Fisher Curve Estimates, Corrected for Statistical Problems,
5 States, 1964-1986

CochraneOrcutt
State
MO

no

WA

yes

CO

yes

ID

no

WY

no

00

0i

02

03

4251
(.6440)
2.3113
( 6535)
22227
( 9759)
-4 7634
(3 2944)
2 3677
(1 0942)

9545
(.0808)
.4844
(.1457)
7430
(.1041)
24758
(1.1376)
5911
(.1929)

- 2784
(.0574)
-.1932
(.0555)
- 1616
( 0549)
- 1007
(.0750)
- 0741
(.0278)

3499
( 0757)
0746
(.1191)
2539
( 0735)
.2122
( 2002)
.0638
(.0572)

04

-.1135
(.0833)

JarqueBera

R2

h

.884

-1.63

683

.911

.507

-2 43

446

1 054

.855

.237

1.007

850

1 649

.443

.716

1.902

1.351

RESET

Standard errors in parentheses In the case of the Cochrane-Orcutt 3SLS regressions, the time period covered is 1966-1986
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changed as a result of this improvement in the specification of the model.
Changes in the other estimated coefficients are also minimal.
The problem of auto-correlation in the residuals of the Phillips curve
for Washington may be checked by applying 3SLS to the CochraneOrcutt transformed variables. This procedure has a slight impact upon
the unemployment coefficient in the Phillips curve, raising it a little
above the value observed in table 2.1. Correcting for auto-correlated
residuals in this manner reduces the coefficient on expected price infla
tion in the Phillips curve, which now becomes insignificantly different
from unity. In the Fisher curve, the unemployment persistence coeffi
cient is reduced when the Cochrane-Orcutt transformations are applied.
Correction of the serial correlation observed in the Fisher curve
residuals in Colorado also has a rather slight effect on the unemploy
ment coefficient of the Phillips curve. The coefficient again rises some
what in absolute terms, indicating that wages in that state are rather
more responsive to external labor market conditions than the basic
model (uncorrected for serial correlation) would imply.
The inclusion on the right-hand side of the Fisher curve of a lagged
and squared dependent variable succeeds in eliminating the misspecification bias observed in Idaho The impact of this specification
change upon the Phillips curve is slight. In the Fisher curve, the
coefficients on aggregate demand growth and wage inflation both still
fall a little short of significance at the conventional levels. The latter
coefficient implies a slightly higher Okun coefficient than was the case in
the basic model. Inevitably, though, the greatest impact is on the lagged
unemployment rate coefficient; an unfortunate cost of the correction of
misspecification bias is that we can no longer interpret this term as a
measure of persistence.
The case of Wyoming is somewhat unusual. The main source of
concern is the high RESET value obtained in the Fisher curve, but there
is evidence of problems other than functional misspecification. In par
ticular, the within-sample forecasting power of the Phillips curve is
weak, and an examination of the residuals generated by this latter
function indicates that there may be substantial measurement error in
the dependent variable in 1972. At this time there was a revision of the
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Standard Industrial Classification; the consequent redefinition of the
manufacturing sector results in a break in the state-specific wage series
at this time. While a number of states were likely affected by this
change, the impact was nowhere as severe as in Wyoming—this is the
only state to have measured a decrease in wages between 1971 and 1972.
To correct for this, we insert dummy variables for 1972 and 1973 into
the Phillips curve equation. This has two main effects. First, the diag
nostics indicate substantially improved performance of the model. In
particular, the RESET statistic associated with the Fisher curve falls
dramatically to 1.90. Second, the unemployment coefficient in the
Phillips curve is closer to zero than is the case in the uncorrected model;
this indicates that wages are relatively less flexible to local labor market
conditions.
In this section, we have tackled head-on the small number of statis
tical problems churned up by the implementation of the basic model to
state-specific data. It has been essential to fix up these problems at this
stage; misspecification of the model and non-normal residual terms can
both lead to biased estimates, while the presence of auto-correlated
residuals implies that the predictions of the model are inefficient. For
tunately, as we have seen, it turns out that the estimates of wage
flexibility provided by the basic model of the last section are changed but
little when we correct for the various statistical problems encountered.
We now turn to fixing up the problems identified by the diagnostic
tests for metropolitan areas. We therefore concentrate on just five
metropolitan areas: Boston, Dallas-Fort Worth, Washington DC, De
troit, and Minneapolis-St. Paul. The Phillips and Fisher curves, cor
rected for the statistical problems identified above, are reported respec
tively in tables A.6 and A.7.
The misspecification in the Phillips curve obtained for Boston in the
basic model can be checked by introducing a quadratic term in the
lagged dependent variable. This leaves most of the regression coeffi
cients virtually unchanged. The exception, predictably enough, is the
expected price inflation term in the Phillips curve; the specification
change renders the interpretation of this coefficient unclear. It would
appear, however, that the inclusion of the new term in the Phillips curve

Table A.6 Phillips Curve Estimates, Corrected for Statistical Problems,
5 SMSAs, 1964-1986
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Table A.7 Fisher Curve Estimates, Corrected for Statistical Problems,
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satisfactorily proxies the missing variable, since the RESET statistic
falls dramatically as a result.
The observed non-normality of residuals in the Phillips curve for
Washington can be removed by inserting into the Phillips curve a
dichotomous variable which takes unit value for 1978 and is zero in all
other years. This has a number of beneficial effects. First, the JarqueBera statistic for the Phillips curve falls back into line, indicating that
the source of non-Gaussian residuals has been removed. Second, the
determination coefficient associated with the Phillips curve improves
considerably. Third, the RESET statistic for the Fisher curve falls
sharply, suggesting that this function is now correctly specified. It
should be noted, however, that the coefficient on wage inflation obtained
in the Fisher curve is still low in relation to its hypothesized value. Re
running the system, this time including a 1978 dummy also in the Fisher
curve equation, raises this coefficient to 0.25 (with a t ratio of 3.05), and
has little effect on the other coefficients and most of the diagnostics; we
do not report in full the result of this regression, however, since there is
evidence that the Fisher curve is misspecified—the RESET statistic is
5.01. It is clear that 1978 was not a typical year in Washington.
The presence of non-normal residuals in the Phillips curve for Dallas
can also be checked by the inclusion in the Phillips function of a dummy
variable. This time the non-normality is due to an outlying observation
in 1984, which reduces wage inflation below its expected value. The
estimated parameters of the model are not, in this instance, greatly
affected by the inclusion of the dummy variable.
To correct for serial correlation in the Fisher curves obtained for
Detroit and Minneapolis-St. Paul we have used 3SLS on the CochraneOrcutt transformed variables. The impact upon the coefficient estimates
is slight in both instances.
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